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THE 1982 MINIMUM TAX 
/\;"\CNDMEtrrs l\S A f'I RS'r STEP 
1N Tilt: 'rRAt�SITION TO A 
"FLAT-RA'rE" TAX 
Michael .T. G raetz*
T he mas sive body of ta x legislation enacted in the first two 
years of the Reagan Administration offers little guidance for 
preclicti11g the future d irec tion of llnited States tax policy.  
Draiaatica l ly different Cong ress ional coalitions -- each led by 
the Pre s ident -- passed by very narrow margins the nation's 
largest tax reduction ( the Economy Recovery Tax Act of 1981)1 
and then the next year enacted the largest peacetime tax increase 
(the Tax Equity and F i s cal Responsibility Act of 198 2 ) . 2 In
each case, short-term pol itical and fiscal concerns dominated the 
debate s .  The 1981 legislation r educed taxes i n  a n  effort to 
stimu l ate economic activity and investment by according 
substantial tax relief to bus inesses and high i ncome individuals; 
the 198 2 leg i slation requires significant additional taxes from 
these same sources to reduce triple-digit defic its , a reduction 
also deemed necessary for economic recovery . Although the two 
Acts together provid e  for an overall reduction in business taxes 
and a phased-in d ec rease in marginal tax rates applicable to 
individuals, they impart the overwhelming impression that 
uncerta inty, c onfus ion, and inconsistency currently dominate the 
tax legis lative proces s .  
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Despi te the contriidic tory aspects of recent ti\x 
legislation, howe ver, despiiir at the prospect of coherent 
revision of the federal income tax may be premature. During the 
las t Congress, twelve bills were in trocluce<l by legislators 
ranging across the political spec trum, 3 that propos�<l study or 
enactment o f  a so-called flat-rate income tax. 4 'T'he Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy Subcommittee o f  the Joint Economic Commi ttee 
held hearings on the flat-ra te tax in July and Augus t of 1 982, 5 
the tax writing commi ttees direc ted staff to begin work, and the 
Senate Finance Commi ttee held hear ings on the idea in September 
of 1 982 . 6 Presiden t  Reagan voiced his tentative support of the 
basic concept, calling it "very tempting, "7 and press 
commentary has been both widespread and favorable. As a result, 
the "flat-rate tax" has become the focus of current tax revision 
e f forts. 
This A r ticle addresses the problem of the transition to 
a flat-rate tax. Assuming tha t Congress wants to enact such a. 
tax, how do we move from an income tax riddled with special 
exclusions, deductions, and credits to a broad-based income or 
consump tion tax? Both political ac tors and professional groups, 
including Senate Finance Commi ttee Chairman Robert Dole, Office 
of Management and Budget Direc tor David S tockman, Assis tant 
Secretary of the Treasury John Chapoton, the Staff of the Joint 
Commi ttee on Taxation, and the Tax Sec tion of the American Bar 
Associa tion, have expressed par ticular concern with transi tional 
problems, ci ting the need to protect people who have made 
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economic •lecisi.:)ns "in r�liance11 on the continuen existence of 
special tax provisions.8 
I argue here tha t  the minimum tax 'imen<ll'lents of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Reo;ponsibility Act of 1982 placed in to the 
In ternal Revenue Code a transitional mechanism that can be 
regarded as a first step to phasing in a broad-based tax. I then 
outline a series o f  future amendments to the minimum tax and 
o ther changes necessary to complete the path to a broad-based 
.income tax. Before proceeding to these observa tions, however, I 
first ciescribe the fla t-ra te tax concept anc'I make some general 
comments on the nature o f  the transitional problems invol verl in 
moving from current law to a broad-based tax with lowered rates. 
I then trace the intellec tual and political origins of the 
minimum tax provision, describe the 1982 amendmen ts to the 
minimum tax, and indicate why the minimum tax provides an 
appropriate vehicle for transition to a fla t-rate tax. A f ter 
illustrating the additional amendmen ts required to move the 
minimum tax fro1n its current secondary s ta tus to center s tage as 
the vehicle for transition to a broad-based income tax, I 
demonstrate why the 1 982 minimum tax amendmen ts will not serve an 
identical purpose if a broad-based consumption, rather than 
income, tax were the ultimate goal. 
This Ar ticle assumes that a move to a broad-based low-
rate tax is both feasible and desirable an4 accepts the ra ther 
convincing case that has been made tha t a broad-based income tax 
could be superior to present law on economic efficiency, 
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hori zontal equ i ty, and simp l i c ity grou nris . CJ I have al sr.i 
general ly accepted, at least for present purpos es, the view tha t 
these goals are more l ikely to be reali zed with as uni form and 
as broad a tax base and low rates as is practical . By limiti ng 
my concern here to the problem of transition, I avoid d etailed 
consideration of the m erits o f  particu lar base b road ening 
issu es . 1'herefore, this Arti c l e  only brie fly addresses some o f  
the many difficu l t  and controversial issues which w i l l  arise in 
the move to a low-rate broad-based income or consump tion tax. I 
attempt here merely to demonstrate that the problems o f  
transi tion to such a regime, whi l e  important, are not 
insurmountab le; that in fact Congress has taken an important 
first step i n  this direction in its 1982 amendments to the 
mi nimum tax; and suggest a general out line o f  subsequent steps 
to comp lete the path by bui lding on that first step. 
I .  l\. "FLl\.T-Tl\.X" DEF INED 
The u ni fyin g theme of all flat-tax proposals i s  a substantial 
broadening of the tax base coupled with a s ignif icant reduction 
of margi nal ta x rates .  The principles u nderlying this theme are 
s impl e: cease the practice of regarding the income tax as 
chicken soup, as a potential cure for every i l l  affecting 
society; el iminate the many exclus ions , dedu ctions, and credits 
that popu l ate the income tax; and thereby broaden the tax bas e 
to such an extent that revenues at least equivalent to present 
amou nts can be raised with signi ficantly lower tax rates . 
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Several j us tificati<:> ns ha ve heen ad vanc e<l for implement-
ing a flat- rate tax . P ropone n ts of such a ta x r eform contend 
that greater. econom ic eff iciency can be achiever] through the 
gr eate r neutra lity that wou ld resu l t  from broadening the overall 
tax b as e  and low ering marg ina l rates. Thi s  greater neutrality 
would redu ce the interference that taxes have on the al location of 
resources and mitigate the advers e impact of taxes on incentives 
to engage in productive economic activity. 1 0  By the same
token, a broad-based tax with lower rates cou l<l i mprove 
horiz onta l equi ty -- a wi dely used criterion that requires 
persons in simi lar ci rcumstances to pay similar amounts of tax 
by el iminating provisions which allow some taxpayers to redu ce 
the ir taxes because of either the source of their income or the 
type of e xpenditure . 1 1  The impact o f  a broad-based low-rate 
tax revision on vertical equi ty -- the d istribution of the tax 
burden by income classes -- w i l l  u lti mately depend on both the 
tax base selected and the rate schedu l e  that emerges . 12
F i nal ly, proponents of broad-based low-rate taxes regard such a 
change as a specia l opportunity to simp lify g reatly the 
opera tion of the income tax . 13
A l though there seems to he widespread agreement that 
broadening the tax base and loweri ng rates is an appropriate 
general d ir ecti on for comprehensi ve tax re form, fundamenta l 
issues, as we l l  as spec ific detai l s, remain extremely 
c ontrover s i a l .  When the time comes to adopt legis lation, 
d i f f erences over s everal issues w i l l  undoubtedly divid e  flat-tax 
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proponents . While thi s l\rti cl e  a nop ts an op timistic attitune to 
both the fea sibi lity a nd desi rabi l ity o f  the a doption of a fla t-
ra te ta x, a bri e f  sum1nary o f  these controversi es is necessa ry to 
comp rehend the i ssues i nvolved in adopting a fla t-rate tax . 
Fi rst, the detail s of ba se broadening wi l l  prove 
extrem e ly controversia l as evinced by the dispa ri ty among the 
twe lve flat ta x bi l ls introduced in the Congress .  Som e o f  these 
bi l ls would rep ea l a ll exemptions, exclusions from in com e, 
a eductions, a nd credits other tha n p ersona l exemptions, whi ch i n  
ma ny insta nces wou ld b e  increa sed. 14 O ther bi ll s woula retai n 
a limited number of deducti ons, exclusion s ,  a nd credits . 1 5 
The i tems se lected for retention, however. vary wia e ly among 
these bi l l s .  
Second, whi le ea ch of the bi l l s  would substa ntia lly 
reduce ta x rates, a variety of ra te s t ru ctures ha ve been 
p roposed tha t would ha ve extremely di fferent impa cts on the 
di stribution of the tax burden . 1 6  N o n e  o f  the hi l l s  recently 
introduced would increase the p rog ressi vi ty of the ta x burden 
compared to the p re sent i ncom e ta x, a l though certai n bi l l s  ha ve 
been desig ned to achieve a di stribution of the ta x burnen by 
i ncome class whi ch approximates tha t of p resent law . 1 7  The 
bil l  i ntrodu ced by Senator B ra d l ey a na Representa tive Gepha rdt, 
for examp l e, would achi eve such a result by app lying ra tes 
ra ngi ng from fourteen to twenty-eight p ercent to a substantially 
broadened incom e  ta x ba se.18 Maintaining a distribution of
the ta x burd en by income c la s s  simi lar to tha t of p resent law 
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ne cessarily re4ui r"!s tha t the top tax rate he red ucer1 no lo"1er 
tha n the average rate now app lica b l e  to high bracket taxpayers 
estimated to be roughly twenty-fi ve to thirty- three p ercent.19 
The T reas ury D epartm ent ha s i nnicaten tha t approximatel y the same 
degree of current p rogressivity couln be retained by taxi ng a 
broa d  income ba se a t  ra tes of ten p e rcent on the fi r st $ 1 9,500 of 
income twenty-five percent on amounts from $ 1 9,500 to $ 7 5,000; 
a nd thi r ty-nine p ercent on amounts over $75,000, with a n  
ex emp tion o f  $ 3,000 per return and $ 1,000 f o r  ea ch 
dep endent. 20 
On the other ha nd, many f lat-tax p roposa l s  would 
drama ti ca l ly redi s t ribute the tax burden by substa ntia l ly 
i ncrea sing the burden of mi ddle a nd lower income cla sses a nd 
si gni fi ca ntly reduci ng the ta x sha re of upp e r  i ncom e  g roup s . 21 
Replacing p rogressi ve tax ra tes wi th a f la t  ra te would 
nece ssarily cause such a shi ft .  The Assi stant Trea s u ry Secreta ry 
for Ta x Policy ha s testi fied tha t a flat si xteen percent rate 
applied to a broad-ba sed incom e ta x ( wi th a $ 5,000 exemp tion for 
a fami ly of four) wo uld p roduce roughly the sam e  revenues a s  
p resent law, b u t  would result i n  a shi ft o f  about $ 32 bi l lion i n  
ta xes from i ndividua l s  wi th more tha n $ 5 0,000 of i ncome to those 
wi th i ncome less tha n $ 50,00o . 22 I ncrea si n g  the exemption to 
$ 1 0,000 would reduce the amount of redistribution, but would 
still result i n  a ta x reduction of $22 bi llion for p ersons wi th 
incom e above $ 5 0,000 and a tax i ncrease o f  $27 bi l lion for those 
i n  the $ 5,000-$ 50,000 income c lasses . 23 It seems rea sonably 
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cer tain tha t a top rate of app roxima tely twenty-fi ve to thirty 
p ercen t  will be requi red to main tain a distribut ion of the tax 
burden rea sonably close to tha t o f  present law.24 
Di sposition o f  the p rogressivity i ssue wi th r egar d to a 
broad-based tax requi res a j udgm en t whi ch Henry Sim on s  aptly 
characterized as "ethi cal-a estheti c, " 2 5  and must n ecessarily be
resol ved through political d eba t e ,  not schola rly anal ysi s .  My 
own ethi cal-aesthetic judgm en t d emand s tha t broad-based tax 
re form not become an occa si on for redistributing the ta x burd en 
from upp er income c lasses to middl e and lower income cla s s e s . 26 
Profe s sor s B l um and Ka lven thi rty yea r s  ago labelled the case 
for p rogressive ta xation " un easy, " 2 7  but the ca ses for
p roporti ona l or reg ressive ta xati on wi ll no doubt p rove eq ually 
un ea s y .  I n  thi s Arti c l e, I therefore a s s um e  tha t a distribution 
of the tax burden amon g  cla sses a t  least a s  p rogressive as un der 
p resent law shoul d  be retain ed in the move to a broader ta x ba se 
wi th substantial ly reduced ra tes . 28 My con cern for main taining 
a di s tribution of a tax burd en whi ch is not mark edly less 
p rogressive than tha t o f  curren t  law n ecessaril y in fluen ces my 
choi ces in d etailin g the tran si tion to a broad-based low-ra te 
incom e  tax. 
The thi rd di f fi cul ty of fla t- ta x  proposal s i s  tha t there 
i s  con sid erable con trover sy about how to tax busin ess incom e ,  
especially the in come o f  lar ge corporation s. Many of the 
broad-ba sed tax r evi sion bi ll s  do not add ress the questi on o f  
corpora te income ta xation a t  a 1 1 . 29 The B radl ey-G ephar dt bill , 
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on the o ther hand , makes no changes in the corpora t e  income tax, 
and expli citly main tain s current ra te s , sp ecial d eductions , an d 
cr edi t s . 30 O ther p roposal s apply the curr en t  corporate incom e 
tax rul e s ,  but wi th substan tially lower ra tes . 31 Still o ther s 
woul•i broaden the corporate tax ba s e ,  l ower the ra tes , and 
elimina te indi vidual income taxes on dividends , inter es t ,  or 
gain s fro1n the sal e of a business . 32 Finally, s om e  of the 
proposals a ttemp t to con form corporate taxation to flat-ra te 
p roposal s f or wa ge or consump tion taxation, rather than to 
in divi dual income taxation.33
Coordination o f  corporate and other busin ess ta xati on 
wi th the fund�nen ta l base-broadening chan ges in in divid ua l 
taxation seem s  essen tial to avoid crea tion of n ew ta x p lanning 
oppor tuni ti es whi ch could d e feat the purpose of ba se-broa d ening . 
Coordination of corpora te and individua l ta x ra tes i s  simi larly 
n ecessar y .  A d etailed discussion o f  the changes i n  corpora te 
taxation appropriate to a broad-ba sed ta x reform is beyond the 
scope of thi s Arti cl e .  Integration o f  corpora te and individua l 
incom e  taxes an d the app ropria te trea tm en t  of corpora te income 
and di s t ri bution s in the con text of con sump ti on ta xes at the 
in dividual l evel ha ve been recen tly expl ored in consi derabl e  
d etail in the li tera ture . 34 I wi l l ,  however, very bri e f ly 
examine i ssues of busin ess and corporate ta xa tion . 
Finally, f lat-ta x  proposal s ha ve rai sed the q ues ti on o f  
whether income or con sump tion i s  the app ropria te broad ta x 
bas e . 3 5  The advan ta ges an d di sadvan ta ges of an income ta x 
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ver su s  a p er sona l  ta x on consump tion a nd the problems o f  impl e-
menting such a ta x ha ve r eceived grea t  scholarly a t tention in the 
l itera ture in the past sever�l year s , 36 and I do no t intend to 
review those deba tes her e .  I do, however, di scuss th e cho ice 
between consump tion and income ta xes in Section VII insofar a s  
tra nsitiona l  issues a r e  a t  stake . 
II . PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION TO A FLAT-RATE TAX 
Cha nging the current income ta x to a broa d-ba sed low-ra te income 
tax wou l d  constitute a major revis ion of the ta x sys tem, a nd a s  
the Chairman of the Ta x S ection o f  the Amer ican Bar Associa tion 
ha s noted, this cha ng e "would cr ea te unusually signi ficant 
[ transition] problems."3 7  He wa s undoubtedly corr ect when he 
sta ted: 
[ I ]t is not enough to consider fundam enta l  ta x 
r eform in the abstra ct. Ra ther a ny far-reaching 
cha nge in a ta x system as complex as our s, on whi ch 
ta xpayers ha ve r e l ied in making decis ions, w i l l  
necessar i ly involve considerab l e  comp lexities i n  
the transition . Needless difficulties will be 
avoided i f  such transitiona l ques tions ar e 
consider ed from the beg inning as par t  of the ba s ic 
ta x r eform itse l f . 38
Trans itiona l  problems wer e a l so empha si zed by the A s s ista nt 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Pol icy3 9  a nd the 
D ir ector of the Congressiona l  Budg e t  O f fice40 in the ir 
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r e cent tes tim on�· b e fore the Senate Fi nance Comm ittee ;i nd in 
a ·pamphlet a na lyzing flat- tax proposa l s  prepar ed by th e 
Sta ff o f  the Joint Commi t tee on Taxation for tha t same 
Conuni ttee . 41 �one of the broa d-ba s e  low-ra te tax bil l s  which 
ha ve been introduce•l adclr ess tra ns i tional issues, a lthough some 
conta in d e layed effective dates . 42 
In g en era l, ther e ar e two ba sic att itudes r egarding 
tra nsitions i n  the ta x taw. 43 The pol it ical ly dom ina nt
approach to sig n i fica nt cha ng es i n  the tax law ha s been to 
protect the expecta tions o f  taxpa yer s who ha ve "re l ied" on 
exist ing law; such protection typ i ca l ly takes the form of 
"grandfa ther ed" effective da tes . 44 The Tr ea sur y, for examp le, 
has in the pa st argued for "grandfa ther i ng" in the case of a move 
ei ther to a broa d-ba sed incom e  or consump tion ta x . 4 5  An 
a lternative p er sp e ctive on ta x law tra nsitions, which I have 
adva nced in greater deta il elsewher e, is tha t neither fa irness 
nor e f f iciency demands g ra nd fa ther ed e f fective dates . Ra ther, 
when the mag nitude of cha ng e  is large, i ts impa ct should be 
r educed through delayed or pha sed-i n  e f fective dates ra ther tha n 
grandfa ther ing.�6 This approach to tra nsitions has been 
g enera l ly endor sed by the Sp ecia l  Comm i ttee on Simp lification o f  
the Tax Section of the Am er ican Bar Associa tion. 47 
The pr incipa l ca use for concer n by proponents o f  gra nd-
fa ther ing is the loss in wea lth by per sons who made decisions 
with the e xpecta tion tha t the old law would r emain in e f fec t . 48 
I n  par ticular, "pr i ce cha ng es" would occur in investments tha t 
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receiverl preferential treatment under the current income tax, hul 
would not receive such favored treatment under a broad-based 
tax. The price of such assets would decline because potential 
buyers would no longer be attracted by a tax-favored yield.49 
Proponents of grandfathering have urged that such rules protect 
against the alleged inequities resulting from frustration of 
taxpayers' expectations that their assets would continue to 
receive tax-favored treatment.50 
The argument, however, that reliance on existing law 
should be protected as a matter of fairness is problematical and 
suffers from circularity. This argument, in e·ffect would treat 
recipients of tax benefits as if they had entered into a contract 
with the government that precluded the government fro•n changing 
the law. The argument is often little more than an assertion 
that the status quo should be shielded from normal legislative 
changes. But the existence of expectations cannot be used at the 
same time to justify those expectations. Rights would be 
created, and thus fairness defined, because certain expectations 
have come into being. An empirical finding that expectations of 
no legal changes exist would constitute both the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the holder of such expectations to be 
protected from economic loss caused by a change in law. The 
existence of expectations would thus form the entire circle. 
l\s the Supreme Court has recognized in a rlifferent 
context. "Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order 
to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of 
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essential attributes of sovereign power is also rearl into 
contracts as a postulate of the legal order."51 To be 
reasonable, expectations in the tax law context should be 
tempered by the subjective probability that the law will he 
altered- Tastes and social conditions change, and such changes 
are often reflected in the political process as changes in law. 
Individual reliance on the status quo simply does not suffice as 
a basis for either compensation or grandfathered effective 
dates. 
Moreover, to the extent that people regard fairness to 
require some protection of expectations that are upset by a 
change in law, grandfathered effective date rules will typically 
be inadequate to the task.
52 
Nothing short of perfect 
stability of legal rules seems likely to suffice since 
uncertainty necessarily will produce winners and losers. 
Furthermore, a requirement that once a law is enacted it must 
remain unchanged raises fairness problems itself, particularly in 
the context of law produced in a system such as ours with 
representative democratic and political institutions subject to 
periodic changes in representation and leadership. 
Protecting reliance on the status quo seems particularly 
inappropriate in the context of a move from present law to a 
low-rate broad-based income tax. This is because a significant 
portion of the wealth reductions due to the change in law will 
arise indirectly as a result of the rate-reduction component. In 
such a move, the owners of assets which received preferential 
- 14 -
treatment under the present income tax law would suffer a 
decrease in wealth attributable, in substantial part, to the 
reduction (or in the case of a move to a consumption tax, the 
termination53) of the income tax on other investments. 1n 
other words, even if favored treatment were retained for tax-
preferred assets, the significant reduction in tax rates alone 
would reduce the relative advantage of tax favoritism and would 
induce price reductions of assets in many instances. It is a 
unique quality of "tax expenditure" or "tax preference" 
provisions that, unlike direct expenditures, there are two ways 
to reduce them -- either directly by reduction or repeal of the 
tax preference, or indirectly by reduction or repeal of the tax. 
If, for example, b oth the individual and corporate income taxes 
were repealed, the "Tax Expenditure Budget"54 would be reduced 
to zero. Repeal (or reduction) of only the individual income tax 
would have the effect of making only individual tax preferences 
valueless (or less valuable). 
One might argue, I suppose, that the individual income 
tax should not be repealed or reduced, because repeal or 
reduction would disadvantage individuals who, because of tax 
preferences, now pay little or no tax relative to individuals who 
pay substantial amounts of tax and would reduce the value of 
assets held by persons in the former category. But it seems odd 
indeed to suggest that the income tax should not he repealed 
because it would make worthless provisions such as the exclusion 
of capital gains or the investment tax credit which originally 
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were enactf=!!� to reduce t�1X�CJ. TJn.der such cirr::urnstances, the 
ar•,iuments for pr<)tecting th•)se who hold tax-ravort=d investments 
seem even less compelling than in the narr.ower C<)ntext of income 
tax repeal of a particular type of tax-favored treatment, even 
though their disappointment (and the decline in the value of 
their assets) would be identica1. 5
5 
Another significant criterion for evaluating 
transitional mechanisms is the simplicity of the transitional 
rule.56 Tax simplification, after all, has provided much of 
the original impetus for flat-tax proposals.57 It is there-
fore essential to avoid adopting a program for transition to a 
.flat-rate tax that will threaten the opportunity for simplifi­
cation that base-broadening with lowered rates accords. For 
ex�nple, it has been suggested that capital gains which have 
accrue•l but remain unrealized prior to the date of enactment 
might be grandfathered so that the new rules would apply only to 
appreciation occurring after the effective date.59 Such rules, 
however, would create an inordinate amount of complexity by 
re�uiring segregation of assets acquired prior to the change in 
law and valuation of those assets on the date of enactment. For 
reasons of complexity alone, g randfathered effective elates should 
be eschewed under such circumstances. 
1n the current context, therefore, I would hold to my 
earlier conclusion that grandfathered effective dates should not 
be enacted to protect individual assets that receive favored 
treatment uncler present income tax law. 't'he relevant criterion 
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for assessing the efficiency and equity aspects of a change in 
law is the magnitude of the effects occas ioned by such a change. 
Where the magnitude of a change and its impact on wealth is 
large, concerns for efficiency and fairness may suggest that 
phase-in or delayed effective dates be us•�d to mitigate that 
impact. 59 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has 
also recognized that phased-in effective dates can be used to 
"moderate wealth changes on existing assets and provide taxpayers 
time to adjust."60 A phased-in effective date can be effective 
in achieving a desired moderation of wealth effects and can 
provide taxpayers time to adjust to the new regime. 61 Phased-in 
effective dates should be selected, however, in a way that does 
not create ,"perverse incentives for taxpayers to make 
non-economic, tax-motivated investments during the transition 
period."62 
Although delayed or phased-in effective dates may be 
used to mitigate the magnitude of a wealth change resulting from 
a significant change in the tax law, these techniques are not 
without certain drawbacks. Termination dates of tax preference 
provisions, a relatively recent phenomenon, have routinely been 
extended by subsequent Congresses, thereby further delaying 
changes in substantive rules. The tax treatment of vacation pay 
for example, was often postponed year-by-year.63 Tax redutions 
enacted with a future effective date have also sometimes been 
repealed as the crucial date approaches. "l'his latter phenomenon 
occurred most recently when the Tax E quity and Fiscal 
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Responsib ility l\ct CJ f l 982 repc<llcd substant i.al busi11ess t<t.x 
reduct i.•)ns scheduled to becoine cf fee ti ve in 1 985 and 1986 through 
further liberalization of depreciation allowances adopted in the 
r::ccrnornic Recovery Act of 1981 . Congress took back $11.4 billion 
in scheduled tax deductions on the grounds that economic 
performance and fiscal policy concerns which had emerged in the 
short interval between the two Acts justified repea1.
64 
The inability of Congress to bind future Congresses 
through the use of delayed effective dates may in some cases 
render this device unsuitable as a means of insuring an orderly 
and predictable transition to a new state of law. In the instant 
case, unless the delay were sufficiently short and reversal 
sufficiently likely because of extant and expected political 
conditions (the continuation in office through the delay of the 
crucial political actors might be one such example) , a delayed 
effective date probably will not work. Because of the necessary 
elimination of tax-favored treatment of a broad range of assets 
and the ability of currently benefited special interest groups to 
mobilize their arguments for continuation of favored treatment 
during the delay, the practical likelihood of moving to a 
broad-based income tax via a delayed effective date provision 
seems slight. 
If both grandfathered effective dates and a delayed 
effective date are to be eschewed for the reasons set forth 
above, a phase-in of the move to a broad-based tax with lowered 
rates seems to be the only available course. A phase-in could be 
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ta rgeted ra th er preci sely to a ch i e ve the •l es ire<l ma':)nH.11•le of 
wea lth e f fects an d to occasion app rop ria te m ov1,ment to a new 
reyim e .  6 5  Th e prin cipal obj ec ti on to a pha sed-in e f fe c tive 
da te i s  its complexity . 66 Tl. phase-in, of course , is al so 
subject to the objec tion tha t  a s ubsequen t Con gre ss •night cl e flect 
th e law from its ta rgete<l course , bu t beca use a ph ase-in involves 
takin g immedia te steps toward th e ul timate goa l ,  thi s  obj ec tion 
would have less force than a ga in s t  a d elayed e ffective da te.  
Wh en , a s  h ere, a fun dam en ta l  change in law i s  a t  stak e ,  th e 
greater the imm edia te m ovemen t  in th e new direction , the gre� ter 
the likelihood tha t the u l timate goa l  wi ll be rea li zed a s  
scheduled .  
Th e ta sk in volved in pha sin;i-in ei th e r  a broail-based 
incom e  or consump tion tax with lower ra tes -- a so- ca l le<l fla t  
tax -- i s  t o  find a m ean s o f  ena c tin g th e phase-in wi th out an 
in ordinate inc rea se in tax comp lexity, in e f fi ci ency, un fairn ess , 
or arbitra r in es s .  Fortuna tely , th e tax inc rea se on higher income 
taxpayers occa sioned by the 1 982 amendments to the minim um ta x 
ha s ( n o  cloubt inadverten t ly) put into p lace a minim um tax a lmost 
i<l ea�ly suited to the function o f  pha sing-in a tran si tion to a 
broad-based incom e  tax with si gni fi can tl y red uced ra tes . 
I I I  THE EVOLUTlON O F  THE MINIMUM TAX 
The minim um ta x con cept ha s been a ta x re form sh owpi ece for 
leaders o f  both politica l parti e s  over th e past thi rt.,en years , 
a nd ,  as a som ewha t distant offspring of the " comp rehensive tax 
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base" dehates 67 originated in cuncerns vir tu ally iden ti cal to 
thos e now inspiring political l eade rs to call for a f la t- ra te 
tax. lt is th er e fore fi tti ng thnt th e 1982 a menilm en ts to th e 
m ini1nurn tax rr1) vi sion , the thicrl ma jor revi sion sin ce its ena c t-
men t  i11 1969 , have n ot only res tor ed much o f  th e origina l 
concept of the provi si on i t se l f  h ut have also re s tr uctured th e 
minimum tax so tha t  i t  i s  an app rop ria te vehi cl e  for tran sition 
to a broad-based income tax wi th l ow ra tes. 
N ea r ly twenty yea r s  ago , in 1964 , Sena tor R ussell Lon g  
cal l e d  for the enactm en t  o f  wha t  h e  <l escribed a s  an " op tional 
simp li fied tax , "  perhaps the c losest p rior politica l  ana logue to 
th e comp rehensive tax ba se and to curren t  flat-tax 
p rop osals . 68 In g en era l ,  Sena tor L on g ' s  p roposa l wou ld have 
given taxpa yers an el ecti on ei th e r  to comp ute taxabl e incom e  in 
th e n orma l mann er and app ly th e regula r  ra tes or to app ly a 
lo.r er rate sche<l ul e to an expand ed tax ba se . Th e expanded base 
. wa s to b e  comp uted by sta r t ing ( a s  does th e 1982 m inim um ta x )  
wi th a djusted g ross income a s  defin ed in section 62 o f  th e 
In terna l R even ue Cod e  -- genera l ly gross in com e  less trade and 
busin ess exp en s e s ,  certain losses , and capi ta l gains and capi ta l  
loss d eduction s  - and a ddin g certa in items n ow e ith er exc l uded 
from g ross income or d educted in a r rivin g at ad j usted gross 
incom e .  Thi s ta x ba se woul<l ha ve in cluded many items now 
exclui'! e<'I f rom in com e ,  such as in terest on state and loca l  debt, 
the exclud ed portion o f  capi tal gain s ,  emp loyees' p en si on and 
death ben e fi ts, two-thirds o f  Social Securi ty and Rai lroad 
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Retirem ent benefi t s , 69 and scholar shi ps and f e l l ow ships . In 
addition, it wou ld have disallow ed many of the deductions now 
avai lable,  i nc luding m edical expenses , chari table contributions , 
cer tain state and local taxes , and nonbusin ess inter est 
expense s .  Even thi s bi ll , how ever , would have excluned from the 
opti onal tax base many i tem s that would be in c l ud ed by 
proponents of a compr ehensive tax base -- f or examp l e ,  
unr ealized appreciation of property tr ansferred b y  gif t or at 
death, i nter est earned on life insurance reser ves , an d imputed 
rent on owner-occupi ed hom es . 70 N otwi thstan ding Senator 
Long ' s  c l aim that hi s proposal wou ld achi e ve substanti a l  s impli­
fi cati on of the l aw and would "reduce the premium en joyed by the 
taxpayer who has tax l awy er s  and accountants to show him w ays to 
avoid paying taxes " the e l ec ti ve natur e  of the proposal would 
have r eq uir ed per sons to compute tax usi ng both thi s method and 
the reg u l ar computati o n  and would thereby have con tributed to 
greater income tax complexi ty.7 1
S e nator L ong's " optional simplified tax m ethod " seems , 
how ever , to have been the pr ecursor of the mi n inum tax 
recommendation of the 1968 Treasury Tax Reform S tudies of the 
J ohnson Admi nistration . 7 2  TJnder thi s minim um tax proposa l ,  an 
individu al would have comp uted tax liabi lity u nder the g en er a l  
r u l es an d also wo uld have made a speci a l  t a x  computati on by 
applying tax rates equal to one-half the applicable r egular 
income tax rates to an expanded income base . If the speci al 
computati on r es u l te d  in a greater ta x liabi l ity,  the larg er 
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am ount woul.l have been required to he pairl . The e xpanden tax 
base under thi s  minim um tax proposal wou l n  ha ve been ta xable 
in com e  increased by the fo llow ing four i tems of tax prefer ence: 
{l) tax-e xempt i nterest on state and l ocal honds; ( 2) the 
appreciation in value of pr oper ty donated to chari ty; ( 3 )  the 
exc lun ed one-half of capi tal g ain s; an d (4) percen tag e dep letion 
a· fter the cost of the pr operty had been r ecover ed . A special 
$ 10,000 standar d  deduction in lieu of the i temi zed deductions 
wo uld have been al low ed in computing minimum taxable incom e .  As 
a complem ent to i ts minim um tax proposa l ,  the Tax Reform S tudi e s  
inc luded a pr oposal f or an al location of i temi zed deducti ons 
betw een taxed in com e and exempt incom e  with disal low ance of 
deductions allocated to exempt incom e . 7 3
Pr esi dent Ni xon ' s  1969 t a x  r eform propo sal s  inclu den a 
"limi t on tax pr eferences" and an allocation of deductions 
simi lar in eff ect to those proposed by the Tax Reform 
S tudi e s . 74 The H ouse o f  Representatives ' ver si on of the 1969
Tax Reform Ac t adopted the limit on tax prefer ences an d 
al locati on of deductions proposal s  but m oclifi ed the li st of 
prefe rence item s . 75 The S enate Fi nan ce Committee eliminated
bo th of these provisions and substituted a new provision whi ch 
i t  l abeled a minimum tax. Thi s provi sion, how ever , w as really 
an additional tax of five per cent on certain pr eference i tems 
applicabl e to bo th i ndividua ls and corpor ati ons . 76 The five
percent addition al "minimum" tax w as am ended on the Senate 
f l oor: the r ate of tax w as i ncr eased to ten percent to be 
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applied to the excess o f  the sum o f  tax preferences over the 
amount o f  feder a l  income tax o therwi se imposed for the taxab le 
ye a r . 7 7  The Co nference Commi ttee accepted the Se nate version
with o nly minor modi fi catio ns,7B and thi s provi sio n remai ned 
e ffective wi tho ut major chang e unti l  the T a x  Refo rm Act of 1976 . 
I n  1 97 3 , the Ni xo n Admi ni stratio n selected , as it had 
in 1 969 , an alternati ve mi nimum tax as the fulcrum o f  its ta x 
re fo rm package- Thi s tax would have bee n payable o n ly i f  i t  
exceeded the reg ular t a x  liability.7 9  O n c e  ag ai n, how ever,
the a l te rnative mi nimum tax appro ach was rejected by the 
Co ngres s ,  which i nstead opted fo r substantial i ncreases i n  the 
addi tional "minimum" tax provisions enacted i n  1969 . BO The
mi nim um tax w as revi sed in 1976 by increasi ng the rate from ten 
to fi fteen percent and replacing the $ 3 0 , 000 exemption and the 
deduction for regu lar income taxes with an exemptio n o f  the 
g reater o f  $ 1 0 , 000 or o ne-hal f  o f  the r egular i ncom e tax 
liabi lity. B l The 1976 Act also added certai n  new i tems to the 
li st o f  tax preferences, including itemized deductio ns ( o ther 
than medical expenses and casualty lo sse s )  in excess o f  sixty 
percent o f  the taxpayer ' s  adjusted g ro ss i ncom e fo r the 
ye ar . B 2 The 1 976 reduction i n  the mi nim um tax e xemp tio n  had 
th e ffect o f  substantially increasing the number o f  per sons who 
were req uir ed to pay mi nim um ta x and, i n  combinatio n with the 
rate i ncr ease and reductio n o f  the o ffset fo r regular incom e 
taxes, o f  sig ni fi cantly i ncreasing the to tal amount o f  minimum 
tax co l lected. The principal effect o f  adding " excess i temiz ed 
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deducti•)ns11 as a tax p reEeC"ence was the imposi tio n o f  an
arlrliti.onal tax on inrlividuals who h ad a high amo unt of adjustec'l 
gross incom e hut low taxable incom e rlue to large i t·�mize d 
deductions, pri ncipal ly fo r in ter e s t ,  taxes , and chari table 
co ntrib utio ns. 
The most signi fi cant e ffect of the mi nim um tax was the 
i ncrease i n  the tax on capi t a l  g ains due to the inclusio n o f  
capital g ai n s  o therwi se exc luded from i ncome. F rom 1 969 to 1975 , 
the minimum tax had the e f fe c t  o f  i ncreasing the maximum rate 
applicable to long- term capi ta l  g ai n s  f rom 3 5  to 36.5 
percent . BJ The 1976 am endm en ts prod uced a m axim um long-term 
capi tal g ai n s  rate o f  3 9 . 9  per cent . B4 Mo reo ver , a " tax 
p re ference o ffset" p ro vision o f  the maximum tax o n  earned i ncom e ,  
adopted i n  1969 a s  a complem ent to the mi nimum t a x  provi sio ns , 
had th e  po tential to increase further the maximum rate on capi tal 
gai n s  to 49 . 9  percent, compared to a 50 percent m aximum on ear ned 
i ncome.8 5  (Unear ned income was sub j ect to a 70 percent m aximum
rate duri ng thi s perio d . ) 
By 197B, how ever, Cong ressional co ncern had shi fted away 
from taxi ng high-income taxpayers who pai d little tax to 
i ncreasi ng " capi tal formatio n . .. B 6  To a Co ng ress concerned wi th 
i ncreasing investment and capi ta l  form atio n ,  the tax burden o n  
capi tal g ai ns w a s  unacceptable, and the R evenue A c t  o f  l97B 
lowered the top capi ta l  gains rate to twenty-eight percent in two 
s teps: fi rst, by i ncreasi ng the capi ta l  g ains exclusion from 
fi fty to si xty percent o f  long-term gai ns ,  and seco nd ,  by 
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e l im inating capital g ains as an item of tax pref erence subj ect t•) 
the add it iona l  m in imum tax. 87 To in sure tha t " capital
f ormat ion w i l l  be f aci l itated , and every individual will pay at 
l east a reason ab l e  m in imum �noun t  of tax w i th r espect to larg e 
capital gains,"8 8  C ongr ess sub s tituted f or the add ition al 
m i n im um tax an alternative m in im um tax which applie<l to capital 
g a in s  and adj u s ted item ized d ed uction s . 89 The add ition al 
m in im um tax w as retain ed on ly f or the other i tems of tax 
pr eferen ce .  
The new altern ative m in imum tax w as computed by applying 
an ind epend en t  r ate schedule to a n ew m in im um ta x base which 
included cap i ta l  g ain s in f u l l. The m in imum tax w a s  payab l e  on ly 
if the alternative tax exceed ed the taxpayer's r egular in com e  tax 
plus the add itional prefer en ce ta x ( which had been somewhat 
r evised ) . The new a l ternative m in imum tax had a $ 20 , 000 
exemption and r ates r ang ing from ten percent to a m ax imum of 
twen ty-f ive percent on relevant in com e in excess of 
$ 100 , 00o . 90 
The Econom ic R ecover y  Tax Act of 1981 r educed the 
maxim um alternative min imum tax rate to twenty percen t  to conf orm 
to the r eduction of the maximum r egular tax rate on capital 
gains, which had been r educed to twen ty per cen t  by low er ing the 
top r ate on ord in ar y income from seventy per cen t  to f if ty 
percen t . 91 
The Tax Equity and F i scal Re spon s ib i l ity Tax A c t  of 1982 
subst antially in creased total m in im um tax reven ues by r epeal ing 
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the "additiona l  minimum tax" provis ions i'\n<l b roadening the tax 
base of the alternative minimum tax .  '!'h is base-broaden ing 
was accomplished by add ing to the a lternative m in.i.mum tax 
base item s of tax pr efer ence that had been subj ec t  to the 
add i t ion a l  m i n im um tax,  as w e l l  as certain other n ew preference 
item s .  The 1982 Act allow s  a m in imum tax exemption of $ 30 , 000 
and impose s a f lat-rate of twen ty per cent on the amoun t  of the 
tax base in excess of the e xemption . 92
IV . WHY TH E 1982 MIN IMUM TAX AMENDMENTS MAY 
B E  REGA RDED AS A F IRST STEP TO A FLAT-RATE IN COME TAX 
The n ew m in imum tax impose s a f lat tw enty per cent tax on a 
br oad en ed income tax bas e ,  and is re quir ed to be paid when ever it 
exceeds the r egular income tax .  Mer ely d escr ibing the 1982 
m in im um tax should make it appar en t that this provision m ight 
w e l l  serve as the f ir s t  step in moving toward a f lat-rate ( or low 
graduated rate ) tax on a broaden ed tax base, an d closer 
exam in ation confirms this view . 93
The d isengagemen t of the m in imum tax rates from the 
r egular r ate schedul e ,  which or ig in ated in 197 8 w ith the enact­
m en t  of a thr ee-bracket a lternative m inimum tax w ith a maximum 
twen ty-f ive per cent r ate on a l im ited al ternative tax bas e ,  
crea ted sever al conceptual d iff iculties f or a m in imum tax 
d es ign ed only as a comp l em en t  to the existing in come tax . 
Wh en the m in im um tax is evaluated as a m echan ism of tr ansition to 
a br oad-based low-rate in come tax,  how ever , the in<l ependent r ate 
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structure becomes an advantag e .  ny happenstan c e ,  the twenty 
percent minimum ta x rate -- no doubt selected because it is the 
m a xim um rate applicable to capi ta l  g ai n s  u nder present law -- i s  
per fectly apt as an approximation o f  a flat tax rate . I f  the 
tw enty percent rate were made g enera l ly applicab l e  it would raise 
revenues in the neighborhood of those presently produced by the 
i ndividual incom e tax . 9
4 
The mas sive shi ft in distribution o f  
the t a x  burd en from high i ncom e t o  low and midd le i n com e 
taxpayers that such a g ene rally appli cable flat rate would 
produce, how ev er , i s  p reclud ed under the minimum tax by the 
combi nati on of its $ 3 0,000 exemption and the requi rement that the 
mi nim um tax be paid only when i t  exceed s  the tax due und er the 
reg u l ar rules . 
The prim ary emphasi s o f  the minimum tax is the 
broadening of the incom e tax base to increase taxes of high 
income i ndividuals who Cong ress has concluded currently avoid 
payi ng their fai r share of taxes under the regular income tax 
ru l e s .  Usi ng the mi nimum ta x as the fi rst s tep in the transi t i on 
to flat-rate tax should therefore foreclose the prospect o f  
Cong ress usi ng the flat-rate tax idea as a smokescreen for 
e limi nating prog ressivi t y  in the i ncom e tax, even though a 
broad-based i ncome tax would u l timately requi re top rates in the 
rang e  of twenty-five to thirty percent i f  a major shi ft in the 
distribution of the tax burden is to be avoid ed. U sing the 
mi nimum tax as a transitional vehi cle wi ll pr ovide a means for 
id enti fyi ng those fl at-rate proponents who are n o t  interested in 
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broad ening the tax base, hut ar e merely engagerl in an e f fort to 
fin•l a poli tically ac ceptable means of suhstan tia l. ly shi fting the 
ta x burden from upper to midd l e  income persons . Wi thout any 
chan9 e in rate, the minimum tax is w e l l-posi tioned to serve as 
the te s ting grouncl of Congressional wi l l  to enac t the base-
broad ening pro visions necessary to complete the move to a more 
comprehensi v e  ta x hase . 
Moreover, the base-broad eni ng aspects of the minimum ta x 
reso l ve i n  a sati s factory manner a number of the thorniest 
politi ca l i ssues whi ch wi l l  ari se in con sideration o f  broad­
based tax re form . The extent to whi ch a broad-based, low - rate 
tax achi eves the advantages of simpli fi cation, economic 
e f fi ciency, and horizonta l equity wi l l  larg ely d epend on the 
comp rehen siveness o f  the base-broadeni ng revisions . A m ore 
comprehensi ve base implies g reater neutrality in treatment hoth 
of sou rces of income and of expenditures , permits lower tax rates
to produce equivalent revenues, and l essens both the 
opportuni ti e s  and incentives for complex tax planning e f forts . 
The u l tim ate goa l ,  therefore , of such revi sion should be as broad 
and uni form a tax b ase as is practi cal coupled with minimal rates 
necessary to m eet revenue d em ands and di stributional 
preferenc e s .  
The 1982 mi nimum tax takes s ubstanti a l  steps i n  the 
direc tion o f  a sig ni fi c antly broadened tax bas e ,  and i ts g reates t 
advantag e  as a tran sitional m echanism is that it s ati s factori l y  
resol ves many di f fi cu l t  i s sues i nherent i n  base- broadening tax 
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re form. By viewing the curr ent m inimum tax as a fir st-s tep 
towar d  a low -rate br oad-based incom e  tax, Congress may a void 
r econsidera tion of many impor tant issues simply by a ccepting 
their trea tm ent under the mi nimum tax .  A d eta iled discussion o f  
the ba se-broadeni ng issues which wi ll ar ise i n  the move to a 
flat-rate i ncome ta>e is beyond the scope o f  this Ar t i cl e, but the 
ma teria ls which fol low highlight some of the m or e  criti ca l  
i ssues. 
Perhaps the m ost signi fi cant advantage of the minimum 
tax as a tra nsitiona l  m echa nism is i ts equa l tr ea tment o f  capi ta l 
ga ins a nd ordi nary i ncom e .  As the history of the m inimum ta>e set 
forth i n  the prior section o f  thi s Ar t i c l e  ind icates, dur i ng the 
period betw e e n  1969-1976 ,  Congr ess took substantia l steps to 
redu ce the disparity in rates between or dinary i ncome and ca pi tal 
gai n s ,  bu t i n  1978 thi s tr end was r ever sed . 95 At the sam e
tim e ,  how ever , Congress ha s i ndicated i t s  wi llingness t o  a ccept 
uni form taxa tion so long a s  the rate is low enough (i n the tw enty 
to tw enty- five per cent rang e) by ena c ti ng an a l terna tive m inimum 
tax whi ch imposes an identica l tax rate on ord inary incom e  a nd 
capita l ga ins. U nd er the minimum tax provi s ions, such u ni form 
tr ea tm ent ha s been a ccomplished wi thout substantia l revision of 
r estr i c tions on dedu ctibi lity o f  capita l losse s96 and wi thout 
a ny " fresh star t "  ru l e  which wou ld grandfa ther gains which ha ve 
accruerl pri or to the da te of ena c tm ent . Certa in impor ta nt 
aspects of capi ta l gain s  taxa tion awa it fur ther co nsideration in 
the conte>et of a m ove to a br oad-based income tax -- notab ly the 
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trea tmen t of •3ain s accrue<1 at death 'l. nd indexation -- but the 
funclament,-.l step o f  ta>eing capi ta l gains and ord inary incom e  a t  
the sam e rate i s  a ccompl ished uncler the mi ni.mum tax . -
� s  with capi tal ga in s ,  the new minimum ta>e pr ovisions 
tr ea t itemized dedu ctions in a manner g enera l ly consistent w ith 
broad-based income tax princ ipl es . Ra ther tha n denying a l l  
item izer} d edu cti ons, a s  som e  proponents o f  compr ehensive income 
taxa tion have sugg ested, the mi nimum tax ru les a l low cer tai n 
dedu ct ions, o ften w i th new limi ta ti ons, and disa llow others; but 
in a l l ca ses the marg ina l tax reduction of i tem iz ed deductions i s  
sig ni fi cantly l essened. Charitable contributions, for examp l e ,  
a r e  a l low ed a s  u nder the r egular tax compu ta tion, but a dollar 
contr ibu ted to char ity wi l l  sa ve only twenty cents of tax under 
the m i nimum tax, a s  compar ed with a maximum of fi fty cents u nder 
the regu lar computa tion. 97 Ca sua l ty losses a nd m edi ca l 
expense s are a lso a l low ed as u nder the r egu lar i ncom e  tax ,  but ,  
i n  addition to having a reduced va lue u nder the min imum ta x,  
a llowa nce of those d edu cti ons i s  sub sta ntia l ly restricted u nder 
other pr ovisions of the 1982 � c t . 98 State a nd loca l taxes are
n o t  dedu ctibl e  under the minimum tax, a nd the interest dedu ction 
i s  lim ited to i nterest incurr ed in fi nancing the taxpay er ' s  hom e 
plus an amount equa l to net investment incom e . 99 The minimum 
tax ther eby a l low s  a dedu c tion for interest on preenactm ent hom e 
m ortgag e loans a nd inter est incu rr ed in a cquiri ng or 
substa ntia lly r enovati ng or remodeling future dw e l lings , but does 
not perm it dedu ction of interest on other consum er loans or on 
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borrowing for investm en ts which c'lo not yi.e lci curr,.ntly ta xabl e 
investm en t  income.1 00 In so doing, it strikes a reasonab l e
balance between the two extremes o f  flat-tax proposa l s  wi th 
reg ard to in terest total disal l ow anc e an d fu 11 decluc t ion . 
In additi on, the treatm ent of tax c redi t s  under the 
minimum tax is very restric ti ve. �11 non r e fundable tax c redi ts , 
other th an the foreign tax c redit, are denied. This rule 
eliminates tax reduction s du e to the r esearch and e xperimental 
tax c redit, 101 the alc ohol fue l s  c r edit, 102 the residen tial
ene rgy c redit, 1 °3 th e targeted jobs c redit, 1 °4 the WIN 
c redi t,105 the chi ld-care c redit, 106 the reti rement incom e 
c redit, 107 and the investm en t  tax c redit.108 No doubt, som e
propon en t s  of broad-based income taxation wi l l  argue that only a 
deduc tion, n ot a c redit, shou ld be a l lowed for foreign taxes, but 
thi s debate can awai t  subsequ en t  stag es of the m ove to a 
f l at-rate tax . There fore, with r egard to credits, the new 
minimum ta x ru les are a signi fican t first step indeed, l eaving 
on ly on e controversy for subsequ en t  resolution as the tax base i s  
further broadened. 
Fin al ly, the list of preferenc es un der the n ew minimum 
tax ru les adds a number of other important tax decluct ions an d 
exc lu sion s avai lab l e  under present law to the bas e . 109 For
e xample, by including perc en tag e depletion anc'l in tangib le 
dri l ling exp en ses110 in the minimum tax base, Congress has
crossed an importan t  politica l  hurdl e .  U sing the minimum tax as 
the vehic l e  for tran sition to a flat-rate tax might there for e  
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forestal l effec tiv e pl eac'ling f or favorable tr ea tm ent by 
hi sto rical ly e f fec ti ve lobbying g roups, such as representati ves 
of the oil anc'l natura l resources inc'lu stries. 
In ad•iition, the minimum tax base includes certain items 
which produc e tax c'l ef erral advan tages un der the regu lar incom e 
tax ru l es, such as mining exploration an d devel opm en t expen s e s  
anc'l th e  e xc ess o f  acc elerated depreci ation over straight lin e 
depreciati on ( wi th longer lives ) on real estate . 1 11 B y  
inc luc'lin g such i tems the minimum tax now has the e ffect o f  
requi ring in divi du al s  who wi l l  b e  subj ec t t o  its provision s  to 
foreg o ce rtain tax deferral incen ti ve provisions which would 
provi de more rapi d  deducti on s  than would be a l l ow ea under a 
measure of economic incom e . 112 
Upon relati vely bri e f  e xamin ation, i t  bec om es apparen t  
that the 1982 minimum tax ru les have appropriately resolved a 
number o f  importan t i ssues which might otherwise becom e 
stum bling blocks in a m ove to a broad inc om e tax base subj ec t  to 
low tax rates: c api tal g ain s, i temi zed deducti on s, tax c redits, 
n atu ral resources, and certain other tax pre fer,?nces have a l l  
been addressed by the minimum tax i n  a satis fac tory m ann er .  Th e  
c omprehen siveness of thi s list i s  demon s trated b y  its inc lu sion 
of every i ssue separately discussed by the J oin t Committee on 
T axation in its treatm ent o f  tran sitional probl ems in moving to 
a broad-based inc om e  tax . 113 Moreover, the minimum tax base
does n ot inc luc'l e any i tern s which are not reasonabl e  c andidates 
for inc lu sion in a broad income tax base.1 1 4
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V .  ADDITIONAL STEPS NECESSARY TO MOVE F ROM TIIE 
CURRENT MINIMUM TAX TO A FLAT-RATE TAX 
A c om prehen s ive con s i deration of the steps n eeded to c omplete 
the move from the 1982 m in imum tax to a broad-based incom e  tax 
with low rates would require an exhaustive review of the i ssues 
taken up in the comprehen s ive income tax l iterature , a task 
which I have exp l ic it ly eschewed here . I do, however, provide a 
g eneral out l ine of the n ec e s sary direc tion and note som e  of the 
most s ign i fican t  i s sues . 115 My choic es in outl in ing 
subsequent steps n ec essary to achieve a g en er a l ly app l ic ab l e  
broad-based income tax with low rates a r e  in fluenc ed by my 
concern for maintain ing a distribution of the tax burden that is 
not markedly less prog ressive than that of c urrent l aw ,  and I 
have attempted to iden t i fy i ssues which are importan t both in 
term s  of revenue an d in terms of estab l ishing neutral tr eatm en t  
o f  inc om e .1 16 
G iven my choice of the m in imum tax as the pr inc ipal 
tran si t iona l  mechan ism ,  there are two types of issues that must 
be c on s idered: ( 1 ) the addition o f  certain c urrently exc l ud ed 
item s  to the m in imum tax base , an d ( 2 ) the resol ution of
existing problem s  which must occ ur independent o f  the m in im um 
tax. The primary consideration in both o f  these areas is the 
establ ishm en t  of a suffic iently broad tax base . Although the 
m inimum tax base is con siderably broader than that o f  the 
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re':lular income ta x, it remai ns in suffic ien t ly comp rehens ive . 
Fu r ther broad en in-;i is therefore ess ent ial; additional sourc es of
both capital an d labor incom e must be added to the bas e .  
I\. l\DDITIONS TO ·r1rn MINIMUM TAX BASE 
1 . E xc lusion s  from Incom e 
Although certain statutory e xcl usions of capital inc ome are 
inc luded in the m in imum tax base -- for exampl e ,  the exc lus ion s 
of d ividend s and interest , c apital g ain s, and percentage 
depletion -- some sign if ican t  om issions remain. Of the se 
om i s s ion s ,  the exclus ion of in terest on state an d local bonds is 
the m ost n otable. 11 7 F rom th e inc eption of the m in imum tax 
ideal , inc lusion of state and loc a l  bond interest has been 
controversial. Tax - e xemp t in terest was am ong th e items of tax 
pref erence in the proposal s  o f  bo th the John son and N i xon 
Adm in i strations in 1969 , was inc luded as a preference in the 
House version of the 1969 Tax Reform Ac t ,  an d was a l so inc l uded 
as a tax pre ference in the Sen ate vers ion of the 1982 
leg i s l ation .1 18 Yet tax-exempt in terest has n ever emerged in 
a l i st of tax preferences approved by a House-Senate 
c on ferenc e . 119 Such interest is un questionably a sourc e  of 
inc ome which should be inc luded in a broad-based tax an d should be 
add ed to the m in imum tax base in the tran si t ion .  I t  m ay prove 
necessary to compen sate state and local g overnmen ts for this 
add it ion by o ffering d irect federal interest subsidies to 
m ain tain reduced in terest c osts at the state an d loc a l  
leve1,120 but the fa i lure to inc lude such in terest i n  a broad 
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i ncom e tax base wo uld be a bad om en indeed. 
Present law exempts f rom i ncom e interest earned o n  l i fe 
i nsurance reserves whenever pai d "by reason of the <'leath of the 
i nsured . " 1 21 I ncom e earned on savings in the form of l i.f e
i nsurance is thus accorded preferential treatm ent whi ch sho u ld be 
eliminated under a broad-based incom e tax .  There may well be 
goo d reason fo r excluding pure insurance g ains even f rom a broad­
based income tax bas e ,  b ut the argum ents ag ai nst taxing mortality 
gains simp ly do no t apply to life insurance proceeds attributabl e  
to the bui ld-up o f  lif e i nsurance reserves . 1 22 Accordingly,
i nterest earned o n  life insurance reserves should be included in 
any broad-based income tax and , a lo ng wi th state and lo cal bo nd 
i nterest , sho uld be added to the mi nimum tax base in the 
transi tion. 
The reasons for treati ng the transf er of assets at death 
( and gif t) as an occasion for the realiz atio n and taxatio n of 
accrued appreci a tion have been wel l  discus sed in the 
literature . 1 23 The provisio n of present law whi ch exempts f rom 
income taxation unrealized appreciation in assets held unti l  
death has often been cal l ed the si ng le most impo rtant loo pho l e  in 
the i ncom e tax, and Cong ress has o n  severa l o ccasio ns co nsidered 
revi sing these ru les . In 1976 , a pro vi sio n was enacted that 
wo u ld have r equired a carryo ver of the decedent' s  basi s o n  
transf ers o f  appreciated property a t  death , but in 1980 the 
provi sion was repealed retroactively to i ts date of 
enactm ent. 1 24 In movi ng to a broad-based income tax ,  the i ssue
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canno t be ig non,,J , no twiths tanrl in9 it-s r t?cent h i s tory .  11.n 
appropriate transi t io nal s tep wo ul<'I be to add to the ,,inimum tax 
base both unreal.ize•1 appreci a t io n  o f  assets held at death and 
unreal iz e<1 appreciation of assets donated to chari ty . 1 2 5 
11.ddi t io na l ly ,  in light of the emasc1Jlatio n of the e s tate tax by 
recent leg is latio n, co nsi aeration sho ul•i a l so be gi ven to 
i nc lu d ing amounts received by bequest ( o r  gif t )  i n  the minimum 
tax base ( and co nsequently the broadened income tax base ) of the 
recipient. 1 26 
As wi th i ncom e f ro m  capital,  expansion of the mini mum 
tax base with regard to labo r  i ncome sho uld first occur by 
i ncluding a vari ety of sources now excluded by specifi c 
s tatuto ry provi sions . Other than deferred compen satio n,  whi ch 
wi ll be d iscussed subse quen t ly,  and the exclusio n fo r m eals and 
lo dg i ng ,  whi ch wi l l  be co nsi dered in connectio n with no nstatu-
to ry f ringe benefi ts , the principa l statutory exclusions f rom 
gross i ncom e under the current i ncom e tax are for life 
insurance, 1 27 health insurance, 128 si ck pay , 129 certain 
legal servi ces,1 30 and scho larships, f e l lowships , pri zes and 
awards . 1 3 1  I n  additio n ,  the f i rst $ 7 5 , 000-$95 , 000 of earned 
income f rom foreign sources is tax-exempt under certai n  
co nditi.o ns . 1 32 The Internal Revenue Co de provi des o ther ,
som ewhat l e s s  i mpo rtant, excl usions f rom income f o r :  ( 1) com-
bat pay , m u stering-o ut pay, and certain retirement pay fo r 
members of the armed servi c e s ; 133 (2) veterans ' disabi lity, 
survi vo r ,  and pension benefi ts , 1 34 and (3)  the rental value of 
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parso nages a nd re ntal disallowa nces paid to min i.sters . 135 
Various arguments have been advanced for repealing e ach 
o f  these statutory exclusions from income, and, with the 
possible exception o f  exclusions relating to health benefits, 
none would be excluded from a "comprehe nsive" income tax base. 
Broadening the base by i ncluding these items would, of course , 
require reversal of explicit congressional decisions to favor 
labor i ncome o f  particular kinds and would disappoi nt their 
propone nts ( for example, l abor u nions that pressed for the 
exclusion of cer tain legal services), but inclusion is essen tial 
i f  a broad tax base is to be achieved . Adding these items to 
the list o f  pre ferences u nder the minimum tax would be a n  
important step i n  that directi o n .  
2 . Deductions and Deferrals 
Implementatio n  of an income-neutral tax str ucture also requires 
modification of current depreciation rules. The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 e xplicitly divorced income tax 
depreciation rules from any concept o f  economic depreciation, 
a nd provided an arbitrary set o f  cost recovery allowances 
i 11st ead. 136 Al though certain revisions were made in the 1981 
rules by the Tax Equity a nd Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 
th basic thrust of the 1 981 legislation remains u ncha nged. 
Under a broad-based income tax stripped of economic i ncentive 
provisions, depreciation rules shoul n measure the actual cost of 
capital during the taxable period, namely "the reduct .ion in 
value of productive capital occasio ned by use , deterioration or 
- 37 -
obsoles cence." 137 In times of i n flat io n ,  this '1.llowance for 
econo1n.ic clepreciation should incl ude adjustments for i ncreases 
in the general price level. 
The current minimum ta x rules partially correct 
excessive depreciation allowances by including accelerated 
deprec iation on re'1.l property and on leased personal property , 
as well as certai n r apid amortization a llowances , in the minimum 
tax base.138 These rules, however, are inadequate for a broad-
based i ncome tax. The e ntire dif ference between the permittea 
cost recovery allowance and the best estimate of economic 
depreciation should be included i n  the mi nimum tax base . Recent 
empirical work by llulten and Wyco ff 139 provides considerable 
refinement in the estimation o f  economic deprecia tion a nd should 
help facilitate this task, although difficulties will remai n i f  
sig nificant i n flation occurs because o f  the need to index 
depreciation to reflect price level changes. Consideratio n 
should also be given to revisi ng the treatment of debt-fi nanced 
investment either by reversing the � rule, which allows 
i nclusion of debt-fi nanced i nvestment in depreciable basis, 1
40 
or by further adjusting the allowance of interest deductions 
when depreciable property is fi nanced with debt.1
41 And to 
the exte nt that any other deferrals, accelerated deductions, or 
immedia te deduction of capital expenses are not currently in the 
mi nimu � tax , they also would be candidates for i nclusion in the 
tax base. 
3. L�miting Tax Shelters to R elated I ncome 
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Finally , under a truly comprehens ive income ta x basn , the 
provis ions wh ich n ow provide opp or tun it ies for tax shelters 
should be removed . Preferential trea tmen t of certain kin·ls of 
rece ip ts and paymen ts, whether in the form of spe cial 
ex clus ions , dedu ct ions, credits , reduced tax rates, or deferral 
of tax l iab il ity , should be elim inated. Du ring the transi tion , 
however, we should anticipate some reluctance on the part of 
Cong ress to elim inate all tax subsid ies and to forego completely 
this popular means of channel ing investments to achieve var ious 
social policy goals. In the face of this relu ctance, an 
immed ia te elimination of all tax shelters may not he feas ible. 
Fa ir distribution of the tax bu rdens during the trans ition 
however , seems at least to requ i re a l im i ta t ion on the use of 
losses to shelter othe r income.
142 Th i s  could be ac complished 
by adding a provision to the m in imum tax tha t  allows dedu ctions 
f rom " tax shelte r" investmen ts to offset only income related to 
the investment .143 Su ch an approach is now f ound in the 
min imum tax rules tha t  l im i t  the dedu ct ion of interest to net 
investment income,
144 
and close analogies are contained in 
current l im itat ions on dedu ctions for s o- called "hobby 
losses"1 4 5  and vaca tion homes.146 A. general proposal of 
this sort was included in the 1 973 tax reform proposa ls of the 
Nixon A.dmin istrat ion ,
147 and a l im itation on the deduction of 
tax shelter losses was also contained in the llouse of Re presenta­
tives ' version of the 1 97 6 Tax Re form A.ct, but the Sen ate 
re jecte d  the idea and a l im i ta t ion on l osses was not in cluded in 
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tlie f i n al ver s ion.
1 4 8  
13. PROOLEMS '!'1 1 1\'r MUS'!' BE s01,vr::o HlD E P lmDI::N'l'LY FROM Tl!E
M I N C M UM TAX 
1 . Non�1:._�t_u t�ry__I_i:_��'Le_Bene��� 
Sec tiQn 61 of the I n ternal Revenue Code <lefines income as 
inclu<l in g compensation for services whether in cash or in k in<l , 
bu t a wide var iety of employee benef i ts usually referred to as 
"nonsta tutory f ringe benef its "  have been ex cluded from in come by 
In ternal Revenue Serv ice regulat ions, rul ings , or admin is tra t ive 
pract i ce.
1 4 9 Ex�nples are employees ' d is counts, vacation 
fa c il i ties, a i rline and ra ilroad passes , personal use of 
automobiles , and meals in f ree or subsidized company cafe terias. 
In add it ion, meals and lodging are excluded by s ta tu te under 
cer ta in cond i t i ons. 150 However, the a b il ity of certain tax­
payers to obtain tax-f ree fr inge benef i ts th rough these 
p ra c t ices violates s tandards of tax equ ity and produces 
alloca t i ve ineff i c ien cies.
1 5 1  
The impos ition of a b road-based 
income tax requ ires tha t  a comprehens ive se t of p rin ciples f or 
fringe benefit taxation be adopted e ithe r by legislat i on or 
regula tion. 
Given the variety of f r inge benefits ,  developing 
p ra c t i cal rules tha t  in clude most of the benef i t s  in a broad 
income tax base w ill be ex tremely d iff icult.
152 The basic 
rul es mus t d is t ingu ish work ing condit ions f rom in-kind compen­
sa tion. '!'he f ormer would be regarded as p r imarily for the 
benef it of the e nq:>loyer and therefore not includable a s  income 
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to the employee . l\n important nonc ompe nsatory busi ness p11rp•>se 
for providing the g ood or se rvice in que stion to an employee 
should be a p rerequi site for exc lusion. In oth"'r words , benefi ts 
would not be e xc luded unless the good or se rvic e was related to 
the nature of the employee ' s  work and w as som ething ordin ari ly 
useful to someone in th e emp loyee ' s  posi ti o n . 1 5 3
Unlike other issues considered i n  pri or sec tions of 
thi s l\rtic l e ,  the wide variety of nonstatutory f ri ng e  b enef its 
makes thei r inc lusion in the mi nim um tax base seem neith er 
desi rable nor _prac tic a l .  Rather ,  a more appropriate step toward 
broad-based taxation would require Cong ress or the T reasury to 
develop rul es directly i nc ludi ng such amounts in g ross i ncome 
under sec ti on 6 1 ,  a task which wi l l  not be an easy m atter , 
ei ther po li tically or administrati vel y .  l\s a prac tical 
alternati ve,  Congress should c onsi der disal lowing deductions to 
emp l oyers f or f ri ng e  benefits that are diffic ult to value or 
allocate to particular empl oyee s .  Total exclusion of such items 
f rom the tax base is not acc eptabl e  u nder a broad-based incom e 
tax 
2 .  Def erred C ompensation 
The tr eatment of def e rred compensation likewise poses a 
difficult i s sue which does not seem readily susceptib l e  to 
resolution by amendm ent of the minimum tax .  The Tax Equity and 
Fi scal Responsibility Tax l\c t of 1982 substanti a l ly modif i ed the 
rules relating to the exclusion of deferr.ed compensation from 
i ncom e , 1 54 but the basic approach of the Code which al low s
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exc lu siCJns of e1nployer contributions to pension plans f rom the 
current income of employees, and permits self- emp loyed 
·i ndi vidua l s  somewhat si m i l. "ir bene fi ts , has not been 
changed.1 5 5  The e x cl usion f rc)m incom e  of limi ted amounts put 
asi d e  in " Individua l  Reti r�nent Accounts" i s  also 
continued . 1 56 The question of the appropriate treatm ent of 
such am ounts under a broad-based i ncome tax has been subj ec t  to 
debate, and favorable tr eatm ent of limited amounts of deferred 
co1npensation seems justified even under a broad-based i ncome tax 
to mitigate somewhat the nec essary incom e tax bi as i n  f avor of 
present as opposed to future comsumption. The Bradley-Gephardt 
hill deals with the deferred compensation issue by imposing a 
tax of fourteen percent on currently exempt pension and other 
reti rem ent f unds, an approach also sugg ested by the Treasury i n  
B luepri nts for Tax Reform. 1 5 7  Reti rem ent benefi ts f rom the 
g overnm ent, s uch as socia l  security benefi ts , rai lroad 
retirernent benefi ts , and veterans ' pensions should probably be 
. i nc l uded in incom e under a broad-based tax. 1 58 
For present purpose s ,  i t  i s  sufficient to note only 
that the question of the appropriate treatm ent of deferred 
compensation, i ncluding the treatm ent of employer and government 
based plans, requi res resolution as a broad-based tax i s  
consi d ered , a n d ,  i f  past cong ressional ac tion i s  any g uide , w il l  
undoubtedly result i n  particulariz ed compromis e s . Like f ri ng e  
benefi ts , d ef e rr ed compensation does not seem to be an 
appropriate s ubj ec t for potential addition to the list of tax 
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preferen ce i tems under. the minimum tax, an d thi s a.;pect of 
tran si ti on to the broad-based in come tax shou ld be d ea l t  with 
ou tside the minimum tax con t ex t .  
3 .  Tran sf er P ayments 
Consideration shou ld a lso be given to expanding the broad tax 
base to include governmen t tran sf er paymen ts in addition to 
f ringe benefi ts an d def er r ed compen sation . Paymen ts su ch as 
social secu ri ty benefi ts an d veteran s '  pensi on s, n ow excluded 
f rom g ross income, 1 59 are indistingui shable f rom wag es and 
other income an d shou ld theref ore in theory be included in the 
in come tax base . 16° For many in-kin d tran sf ers, valu ation 
wou l d  be difficu l t .  Moreover ,  sin ce the l evel of governmen t 
transf ers i s  presumably determin ed on the assumption that they 
are tax f ree, taxation would simply necessitate an increase in 
their level and perhaps an adju s tmen t  in tax exemptions and 
rates . As a practi c a l  matter, then, the income tax base shou ld 
in c lu d e  only tran sf ers that are not based on need and a re either 
cash or easi ly valued if in kin d .  
4 . The T axati on of B u sin ess Enti ti es 
A lthough detai led consi deration of the i ssues of corporate 
taxati on is b eyon d the scope of thi s Arti c l e , ther e  i s  consi der­
abl e  con troversy over how corporate income shou ld be taxed, an d 
a f ew general observations are in order . Fi rst, the dominan t 
an alytical postu re con cerning a broad-based in divi dual income 
tax i s  g rounded, at l east parti a l ly, in the notion that a l l  
income shou ld be taxed equ a lly regard less of its sou rce. Under 
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thi s view , taxation o f  in come at th e co rporate level is merely 
a mechanism necessary to en su re that undis tributed corporate 
income does not escape taxation .
1 6 1  
Thi s theo retical postu re 
suggests both a criticism and an appropriate revision of the 
cu rren t cor porate income tax .  '!'he separate corporate income tax 
shou l d  be repealed and undi stributed corporate income shou ld be 
di rectly attributed to shareholders an d taxed at thei r marginal 
�ates . 1 62 If a corporate in come tax w ere continu ed, it shou ld
apply on ly to earning s retain ed by the corporati on on the 
g rounds tha t attribution of undistributed corporate income to 
shareholders is impracti c a l .163 An y corporate tax wou ld on ly
serve as a wi thholding tax to be c redited to shareholders as 
corporate income is di stribu ted or attrihuted to them. If an 
expen di tu re tax or a consumption tax were imp lemen ted at the 
in di vidu al l evel ,  the corporate tax shou ld be repealed. 164 
Alternatively, a corporate tax might be retained f or corporate 
di stribu ti on s  as a means of col l ecting tax on preenactmen t  
investmen t s . 1 65 
Expe rience has shown that a corporate tax that vari es 
su bstan ti a l ly in its level of rates and tax base f rom the 
individu a l  tax structu re p rodu ces mi sallocations of resources 
an d inequi ti es because of the ease wi th whi ch corporations can 
be formed .
1 66 The widespread incorporation of individu a l s
eng ag ed in per sonal services to take advan tage of ei the r  lower 
corporate tax rates or advantages for corporate pension an d 
reti remen t plan s  provides ampl e  i l lu strati on of thi s poin t .  
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Both the corporate ta x base and the corporate rate s t ructure 
must therefore be coordin ated with the broad-bas ed, low-rate tax 
imp lem en ted at the individual leve l .  The approach of th·e 
current Bradley-Gephardt bi l l ,  which makes no chang es in the 
corporate income tax ,  l eaving both rates an d special deciuction s 
and credits g en erally unaff ected . theref ore cann ot be 
accepted . 167
If Cong ress "'ere to ag ree to move to a b road-based, low-
rate income tax at both the in dividual an d corporate leve l ,  a 
phased-in approach to corporate tax revision could also be 
accomplished. Ag ain the 1982 amendments , whi ch cut back on 
corporate tax pref erences , poin t the w ay .  Th e  Tax Equity and 
Fi scal Respon sibi lity Tax Act of 1982 contain s provisions whi ch 
reduce certain specified corporate tax prefe rences by fif teen 
percen t .  F urther reductions i n  such preferences could be 
accomplished in conj unction wi th a phased-in e limin ation of the 
tax on corporate earning s di stributed to shareholders as 
divi dends , or through general reductions in corporate tax rates . 
To minimi ze distorti on s  in the a l location of resources and limit 
tax planning opportunities which w i l l  produce complexity in the 
operation of the tax law , as w el l  as ineffici en cy and unfairness 
in terms of hori zontal equity , the corporate tax rate (which 
would presumably apply only to retain ed earning s )  should be 
low e red if the top rate for individua l s  is reduced f rom i ts 
curren t  .fif ty percent l evel to the twenty-fi ve to thirty percent 
rang e. The n ew rate shoul d  be set at a level equi valent to the 
- 45 -
f l at-rate "l.pplicahle to in rlividuals or at a l evel which 
approximates the top rate which wi ll be app licable to a lo..,-rate 
hroad-baseci ind ividual income tax .  
5 .  Indexation 
Inf l ation produces t"'o kinds of problems for an in come tax .  
Fi rst, the substantive impact of tax brackets and specified 
do l l ar amounts chan ges if no adj ustment is made for pri ce level 
changes . The need f or indexation of such amount s  w ould remain 
uncl er a b road-based low - rate in come tax if inf lation is 
signi ficant in the y ears ahea d . 1
68 Second , an income tax base 
in a variety of circumstances requi res dol lars f rom diff e rent 
time periods to be taken into account in meas uring g ain or loss . 
The maj or instances where thi s problem ari ses involve deprecia-
tion deduction s ,  in ven tory accounting ,  an d g ain or loss on the 
sale of assets and debt. Low ering tax rates and broadening the 
tax base may l essen somewhat the impact of inf lation in 
distorting an income tax base, but the basic diffi culty remain s 
unchang ed. As a theoretical matter, basis of assets should be 
indexed to ref lect inf lation , and principa l and interest amoun ts 
of debt should also be adjusted as price levels chang e .  In 
moving to a broad-based, low-rate income tax ,  Congress must 
necessari ly weigh the need for such adj ustments again st the 
compl exity they would necessari ly produce . 169 
VI . COMPL ETI�G THE T RANSITION TO A LOW-RATE 
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DROAD-13ASED INCOME TAX 
When the mi nim um tax base has been bro ade ned as sugg ested in the 
prio r sectio ns of thi s Arti cl e ,  and o ther sig ni ficant hase­
broadeni ng i ssues , s uch as tho se previo us ly di s cussed , have been 
reso l ved, o nly o ne step remai ns to comp lete th« transi tio n to I!. 
broad-based income tax: the establi shm ent of the p roper level 
of perso na l  exemptio ns and rates of tax 
Once the co rporate and individual tax bases have been 
established, rates can be set to pro duce the nesired level of 
revenues and di stribution of the tax burd e n . 1 70 Thus , after
Co ng ress has reso lved tax base i s s ues , the minimum and regular 
tax provi sions sho u ld be i n tegrated both with an exemptio n level 
desig ned to make the broad-based tax widely appli c able to a l l  
but tho se at the poverty level , and with t a x  rates appropriate 
to achi eve the desi red distributio nal consequences . Proceedi ng 
to a broad-based, low -rate tax by first expanding the minimum tax 
base shou l d  provi de important i nform ation concerning the tax 
base that wi l l  u l timately be made g enerally appli cable and 
should eliminate a vast number of disputes o ver transi tio nal 
i s sues . Fo r high incom e taxpayers ,  the minimum tax will 
g radually becom e more g enerally app li cable during the transi tion 
no twi thstanding its high exemptio n of $ 30 , 00 0 .  At thi s stag e ,  
taxpayer s above that level of i ncome wi ll be paying tax o n  a 
broad base at a rate equal to tw enty percent ( at a minimum ) , and 
wi ll pay higher taxes if the reg u lar present i ncom e  tax rules 
apply. When the broad-based tax becom e the g enerally applicable 
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ta x ,  s orne inc rease in the twenty percent rate sho ul•i be possibl e 
wi tho ut intr odu cing new transi t io nal issues o r  resurrecti ng 
iss ues whi ch have been nea lt w i th thro ugh the minimum tax .  
Certa inly a to p rate of twenty-f ive percent, whi ch the Treasury 
Department and o ther s have sug g esten co uln achi eve a simi l ar 
di stributio n of i ncom e ta x burdens as present l aw , 171 or the 
tw e nty-eight percent rate which Se nato r  Bradley and 
R eprese ntat i ve Gepharnt have used in an effort to achi eve a 
di stribution of the tax burden id enti cal to present law , 172
should no t rai se new transi tio na l i ssues . Chang es in tax rates 
of thi s m ag ni tud e have o ccurred througho ut the hi story of the 
i ncom e tax . Movi ng to a f lat rate , how ever , wouln impose a 
substanti a l  new burden o n  mi ddle i ncome taxpayers and wo uld 
introduce ad.dit io nal transitio nal i ssues . 
VI I .  ALT ER NATIVE TRANSITIONAL STRATEGIES IF A 
FLAT-RATE CONSUMPTION ( RATHER THAN INCOME ) TAX IS DESI R ED 
I f  prog ressive tax rates w ere no t desired and a g enui ne f lat­
rate tax o n  co nswnptio n were pref erred to an incom e tax ,  such a 
tax sho u l d  take the fo rm either of a retai l sa l es tax, simi lar 
to that used widely in the states , or a value-added tax, such as 
tho se used in o ther industrialized co untri e s  througho ut the 
wo rld. 1 7 3  Whi le these taxes are g eneral ly imposed o n  less
than a f ull co nsumptio n base, s uch a tax sho uld be applied to a 
broad base at the federal level . Th e  typi c a l  value-added o r  
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reta i l  sa les tax basc:.s shout.'! be expandecl to incl ucle serv ices 
such as medical and hospital care services , financial services , 
foreign travel , and rental payrnents . 174 Re latively s imple
mechanisms cou lcl be adopted to avoicl enacting a regress ive tax
and to insure that a value- added or re ta i l  sa les tax would be 
roughly proportional to a person ' s income. 
To move in this cl i rection, a value-added or reta i l  
sales t a x  should b e  enactecl concurrently with the phasing-out of 
the income tax . I f  a broad-based national value-added or sales
tax were appl iecl to the majority of taxpayers and a d is tribution 
of the tax burden approximating tha t  of current law were 
desired, consideration should be given to retaining an income 
tax for uppe r- i ncome individuals . The min imum tax of the 1982 
Act, p erhaps with the base-broadening amendments suggested in 
prior sections of this Artic l e ,  might we l l  serve the income tax 
func tion. Only if a n  ind ividual ized, progressive ta x on 
consumption were desired should Congress consider a so- cal l ed 
expenditure tax , under which consumption wo ulcl be computecl 
indirectly by d educting amounts savecl from receipts avai l able 
for . consumption or savings .
175 Proponents o f  such a tax argue 
that any move to a broad tax hase should take this course rather 
than taxing income. 
Wi l liam Andrews , the principal architect of current 
broad-based expenditure tax proposa l s ,  fol lowing a s ugges tion by 
the prior g eneratio n ' s lead ing expenditure tax proponent ,  
N i cholas Kaldor, 176 has reconunended that trans i t ion to an
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expen<l iture taic s11<)u l <l he accomp l i she<'I by first pha,.ing- in a 
" s upplemental personal expencliture tax" app l icable to high­
incoine incliv idua l s . 177 And rews ' proposecl tax won l<l basically
be a 9raduatecl cash- flow expenn iture tax clesi gned to replace the 
portion of the income tax in which ,narg inal rates equal or exceen 
forty perce n t .  A n  e xemption o f  ahout $ 3 0 , 000 t o  $ 3 5 , 000 ( $40 , 000 
to $ 4 5 , 000 for j oint retu rns) woul<l exempt those taxpayers below 
the for ty percent marg inal income bracket from tax as under the 
current minimum tax .  Pro fe s sor Andrews argues that such a tax 
woulcl mainta in the prog ressivity of current income tax law, whi l e  
e l iminating " the worst distortions ana inequ ities i n  the exist ing 
[ income] tax [ that] resu l t  from the app l ication of very high 
marginal rates to a base in which there are [ wide] d isparities in 
the treatment of investment returns . "178 Ex isting disparities
in the treatment of such returns would be maintained in the basic 
income tax ( a t  least during a transit ion to a universal 
expenditure tax ) , but the supplemental expenditure tax would be 
imposed on a comprehensive consumpt ion tax base which would not 
provide tax incentives for particular kinds of investments . 179
P r o fe ssor Andrews ' proposal is related to a suggestion 
advanced by the Meade Commi ssion, which urged a consumption tax 
base for a r i ta i n . 1 80 The Meade Commission also considered a 
graduatecl expenditure tax ,  l imited in app lication to higher 
bracket taxpaye r s ,  to ease the transitiona l problems of moving to 
a genera l ly applicable expenditure tax. 181 I t  would, however,
have combined a g raduated expenditure tax with a s i ng l e  basic 
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rate of tax on consumption ( in the form of a value-adde•i tax ) , 
rather than with an income tax .  
The most troubl ing aspect o f  Andrews ' proposal i s  its 
treatment o f  savings . Professor Andrews argues that adopting a 
suppl emental personal expenditure tax in p lace of income tax 
rates over forty percent would provide " re l i e f  for savers "  on a 
much more " coherent and uniform bas i s "  than the many special 
provis io ns of the current income tax . He concludes that 
" [ b] ecause o f  the structure of the chang e the greatest relief 
woul d  be given those whose savings are now most severely 
taxed . "1 82 Whi le this is certainly true , the fact that the 
proposal provides a tax advantage only for the savings o f  persons 
with taxabl e  income of $30 , 000 to $ 3 5 , 000 or more raises serious 
questions about its fairness . The Meade Commission would avoid 
thi s  dif ficul ty by providing an advantage for the savings of a l l  
taxpaye r s .  I t s  combination o f  a value-added t a x  and a 
supplemental graduated expenditure tax therefore seems far 
preferable to Andrews ' income-expenditure tax combination . 
Detailed proposa l s  for a transition from income to 
expenditure taxation have a l so been offered by a Swedish 
study1 83 and by the United States T reasury. 1 84 Doth the 
T reasury and the Swedish studies recommend exclus ion from the 
expenditure tax base of a l l  assets held at the date o f  enactment 
( without regard to the owner ' s  age) but to minimize " inequ itable 
d istr ibutional e ffects" of such treatment, the 'l'reasury 
recommends that taxpayers be required to compute both income and 
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expen•1 iture t.:i.x l iabil ity f.or a ten-year peri•)<i an•l to pay the 
greilter anount. 1 8
5 
The 'l'rt?asury suggests that this 
requirement might be l imiten to wea l thie"C" taxpayers , and thus in 
e ffect recommen•ls a ten-year periocl during which a broad-basan
expenditure tax wouln serve as an a l ternative minimum tax,
payabl e  whenever it exceeds the regular income tax . 1 86 
Under the T'C"easury ' s plan ,  a broad-based consumption 
tax wo uln therefore be approached , as has been suggested here 
for a broad-based income tax, by using a minimum tax as a 
transitional devic e .  However , i n  the case o f  a broad-based 
.consumption tax, the 1982 minimum tax amendments would be 
largely use less in providing a first step . If a consumpt ion tax 
were desired, the minimum tax of current law should be replaced
with a new consumption-based minimum tax, which over time would 
become the general ly applicable broad-based tax . 1 87
A more d irect route to an expenditure tax is poss ib l e ,  
but the transitional problems a r e  substantial .  I have argued 
elsewhere that if a broad-based progressive tax on consumption 
is desired ,  a relatively restrictive attitune should be adopted 
with respect to c l aims for transitional relie f ,  with such 
re lie f general ly l imited to elderly taxpayers .
1 88 The current
generation of elderly taxpayers has been sub j ect to income tax 
du ring preretirement years ,  and it therefore seems inappropriate 
to sub j ec t  the e lderly to a consumption tax during retirement, 
s i nce they wi l l  not have received any of the advantages to 




By happy coincidenc e ,  Congress has strengthened and made 
coherent the provis ion of the minimum tax just as it beg ins 
ser ious consideration o f  moving to a " flat- rate income tax" 
a broad-based income tax with substantially lowered rates . I n  
thi s  Arti c l e ,  I have urged that the 1982 minimum tax amendments 
should be regarded as the first step in the move to a f lat- ta x .  
I t  is a n  important first step indeed, s ince the new minimum tax 
has sati s factori ly resolved such ma jor potential difficulties 
under a broad-based income ta x as the treatment o f  capital 
gains , itemized deductions , and tax credit s ,  and has partially 
resolved other important issues , s u ch as those concerning 
depletion and deprec iation . Moreover,  by using the min imum tax 
as the vehicle for transition , the d i fficult pol itical issue of 
setting broad-based income tax rates and exemptions may be 
postponed unt i l  base-broadening iss ues have been resolved, s ince 
the minimum tax rate now applicable i s  general ly within the 
range considered appropriate by f lat-tax aavocate s .  
Further base-broadening is the necessary next step i n  
the transition and some important add itions to both the minimum 
tax and regular income tax rules have been discussed here . I f ,  
for examp l e ,  Congress were to add to the l i st o f  minimum tax 
preferences interest on state ana local bonds and on l ife 
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insnr'1nce r.eserves , unreal i zen gain on assets trans ferred by 
death and g i ft, the excess of a l l owabl e  depreciation over 
economic neprec iation , and the principal statutory e xc lus ions 
from wages , a ma j or second step woula be accomp l ished Other 
issues wo uld sti l l  require resolut ion . The taxation of fringe 
bene fi ts and deferred compensation are two important examples 
which have been d iscussed in this Article . Revis ion of the 
taxation o f  income from corporations and other enti ties wi l l  
also have t o  be cons idered . I n  particular , the e limination o f  
the . corporate tax on amounts distributed to shareho lners as 
dividends wo uld seem an appropriate change . 1 89 
I do not mean to sugg est here that the subsequent steps 
to ·a .broad-based income tax will be easy or politically non-
controver sial . I merely want to emphasize that i f  such a tax is 
indeed the goal o f  forthcoming tax reform e f fort s ,  many o f  the 
most n i fficu l t  iss ues have already been hurdled by the 1 982 
revisions of the min imum tax .  Further broadening o f  the minimum 
tax base can serve as a testing g round for Congressional wil l to 
enact a uniform comprehensive income tax while restricting any 
tendency to us e f lat-tax proposa l s  as a device for a substantial
shi f t  in the tax burden from upper to low and midn le income 
taxpayers . S e l ection o f  the minimum tax as the tran s itional
vehicle should prec l ude the us e o f  broad-based tax reform s imply 
as a gu i se for the el imination of progressivity . 
On the other hand , i f  the u ltimate goal is a broad-
base d  prog ressive tax on consumption,  and if a minimum tax on 
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consumption were to serve as the trans it ional m echa nism to that
ta x ,  as the Treasury has s uggested, a d i f ferent sequence of 
events would be requ ired . As a first s tep, the m i n imum tax o f  
present l aw would have to be restructured to apply t o  a 
consumption rather than to an income bas e .  
* 
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Plato ' s  assertion tha t no one in soci.ety should be more 
than four t imes as weal thy as the poorest member 
2 7 .  
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probably commands as much ( o r as l ittle) s upport as 
John Rawl s '  d ifference princip le whi ch provides that 
" social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both ( a )  to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged and ( b )  attached to offices and 
positions opened to a l l  under conditions of fair 
equa lity o f  opportunity . "  J .  RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUS'r I C E  
83 ( 1 97 1 ) .  See general ly G raetz , Commentary, in WEALTH 
REDISTRIBUTION AND THE INCOME TAX 4 5 , 45-50 , 53 
(Le ibowitz ed . 1 97 8 ) . 
W. BLUM & H .  !<ALVE N ,  J R . , THE UNEASY CASE FOR 
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ( 1 9 5 3 ) .  
2 8 .  � s upra text accompanying notes 2 1 -24 . My earlier
assumption that a f lat- rate tax is des i rable presumes 
that cons iderations of efficiency , fairness , and 
simp l i c ity are the motivating force behind the f lat- rate 
proposals -- perhaps a questionable conclusion in l ight 
of the fact that e ight o f  the twe lv e current legis lative 
proposa ls signifi cantly reduce the progressi vity of the 
rate structure and would result in a mas sive shi ft of 
the tax burd en . I would be against any f lat-rate 
proposal that substantially shifted the tax burden, and 
both the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
the T r easury seem to share my concern over the
2 9 .  
3 0 .  
3 1 .  
3 2  . .
3 3 .  
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distributional effe cts imp l ic i t  in several of the 
current proposals . §_ee Chapoton Test imony, s upra note
8 ,  at J- 1 1 ;  JOINT COMMITT EE, supra note 3 ,  at J-1 . 
Moreover, a shift in the tax burden of the magnitude 
estimated to resul t from a flat-rate tax with a rate of 
16% -- calculated to be as high as $ 3 3  bill io n  - ­
renders the dispos ition of many transitional questions 
o f  the sort d iscussed here insigni f i cant . See s upra 
text accompanying note 22 . 
�· H . R .  5 5 1 3 ,  9 7 th Cong . , 2 d  Sess . ( 1 982 ) ;  !l . R .
52 2 0 .  
Bradley-G ephard t ,  s upra note 3 .  Senator Brad ley and 
Representative Gephardt have subsequently indicated 
that another b i l l  deal ing with corporate taxation wi l l  
b e  introduced in the N intey-E i ghth Congres s .  Telephone 
I nterview with L es l ie Devl in , Ass istant Press Secretary 
to Senator Br adley ( Jan . 1 0 , 1 983 ) . 
E . g . , H . R .  6070 , 97 th Cong . , 2 d  Sess . ( 1 982 ) . 
E . g . , s .  2 5 5 7 , 9 7 th Cong . , 2 d  Sess . ( 1 98 2 ) .
��� ·  s .  2 147 , 97 th Cong . ,  2 d  Ses s .  ( 1 982 ) . See a l so R .
Hall & A .  Rabuska , s upra note 3 ,  at 5-12 . 
3 4 .  
3 5 .  
3 6 .  
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In the context o f  income taxation, see , e . �, 
BLUEPRINTS , s upra note 9 ,  at 69-7 2 ;  c .  MCLU RE ,  MUST 
CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? ( Brookings I nstitution
1 97 9 ) ; G raetz , D ivid�nd R e l i ef via Shareholder C redits: 
Tax P re ferences U nd e r  Chairman U l lman ' s P roposal , 7 TAX 
NOTES 667 ( D ec .  1 1 ,  1 97 8 ) ;  Nolan ,  I ntegration o f  
Corporate and Indiv idual I ncome Taxe s ,  30 u . s . c .  TAX 
INST . 899 ( 1 97 8 ) ;  Warren , The R e l ation and I ntegration 
of the I nd ividual and Corporate I ncome Taxe s ,  9 4  HARV . 
L .  REV . 7 1 9  ( 1 98 1 ) .  For d is cussions o f  corporate 
taxation with consumption taxation of individuals , s ee 
J .  KAY & M .  KING THE BRIT ISH TAX SYSTEM 1 7 5-200
( 1 978 ) ;  INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES , THE STRUCTURE AND 
THE REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 2 3 3 -49 ( 1 97 8 )  [hereinafter 
cited as MEADE REPORT ] ;  Graetz , Implementing a 
P rogress ive Consumption T ax , 92 HARV. L. REV . 1 5 75 , 
1 634-42 ( 1 97 9 )  [ here inafter cited as Consumption Tax 
Implementation] . 
See Chapoton Testimony, s upra note 8, at J-1 5 to-1 8 ;  
Riv l in Testimony, s upra note 10 , at J-26 to-2 7 ; JOINT 
COMMITTEE , s upra note 3 ,  at J-1 . 
E . g . , ADVISORY COMM ' N  ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELAT IONS , 
THE EXPENDITURE TAX ( I n formation Report M-84 1 9 74 ) ·
3 7 .  
3 8 .  
3 9 .  
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BLUEPRINTS , supra note 9 ,  at 2 1 -5 2 ,  1 1 3 -44 ; S .  LOD I N ,
PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE TAX - - AN ALT ERNATIVE? ( 1 978 ) 
( report of the 1972 Swedish government commission on 
taxation) ( translated into English in 1978 ) ;  MEADE 
REPORT , supra note 3 4 ,  at 28-40 , 1 5 0-74 , 1 87-92 ; WHAT 
SHOULD BE TAXE D :  INCOME O R  EXPENDITURE? (J . Pechman ed . ,  
Brookings I nstitution 1 9 80 ) ;  Andrews , Fairness and the 
P ersonal I ncome Tax:  A R eply to P rofessor Warren , 88 
HARV . L .  REV. 947 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  Andrews , A Consumption-T� 
Cash F l ow P e rsonal I ncome T ax ,  8 7  HARV . L .  REV. 1 1 1 3  
( 1 974 )  [ here inafter c ited as Consumption-Type Tax] ; 
Consum_i:>tion T ax Implementation, s upra note 3 4 ;  
Mieszkowski ,  The Choice o f  T ax Base:  Consumption versus 
I ncome Taxation, i n  FEDERAL TAX REFORM : MY't'HS AND 
REALIT IES 27 ( M .  Bo skin ed . 1 97 8 ) ;  Warren,  Fairness and a 
Consumption-Type or C ash F low P ersonal I ncome T a x ,  88 
HARV . L .  REV. 94 7 ( 1 97 5 ) .
Aidinoff Testimony, s upra note 8, at 1 0 . 
I d .  at 1 1 . 
Chapoton Testimony, s upra note BJ at J -1 5 .
40 . Rivl in Testimony, s upra note 10 , at J-24 . 
4 1 . 
4 2 .  
43 . 
44 . 
4 5 .  
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JOINT COMMIT'rE:l"� .  ��er_� note 3 ,  at J-8 to-9 . 
S ee i d .  at J-9 to- 1 0  ( d is cus s ing the various proposal s ) . 
The paragraphs whi ch fol low summar ize a point made at 
greater length in Legal T r ansition�, supra note 10 , at 
6 0 -8 7 . 
A grandfather rule exempts from any change in law 
certain transactions entered into prior to the date o f  
enac tment . For a general discuss ion of grandfather 
rul es ,  see id . at 6 0 - 6 3 . 
See BLUEPRINTS , supra note 9 ,  at 1 81 -3 1 5 .  See generally 
s .  LOD I N ,  s upra note 3 6 , at 1 2 3 - 2 7  ( t rans i tional rules in
ta x system changes ) ; MEADE REPORT , s upra note 34 , at 
1 87-92 , 1 98 -200 ( transitional e ffects on equity and the 
capita l market ) ;  Committee on T a x  Policy, New York State 
Bar As sociation, R etroactivity o f  Tax L egislation , 2 9  
TAX LAW . 2 1 ,  2 1  ( 1 97 5 )  ( problems i n  retroactive 
legis lation) N ote , S etting of E f fective Dates for Tax 
Legis l ation: A Rule o f  P rospectivity, 84 HARV . L. REV. 
43 6 ,  436-55 ( 1 970 ) ( rule of prospectivity ensures 
protec tion of taxpayer rel iance ) . 
46 . See L egal T ransi tions , s upra note 10 ( d is cussing the 
4 7 .  
4 8 .  
4 9 .  
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impact o f  <ielayed , phased- in, and grandfathe red 
effective dates ) .  
Simp l ification Committee , supra note 9 ,  at 6 8 6 . 
See sources c ited supra note 4 5 . It i s  not the change 
in tax l iabi l it ies which occasions such concerns . It 
has been estimated ,  for examp l e ,  that under a variety o f  
rate s chedu les des igned t o  approx imate the d istribution 
o f  the current income tax ,  the move to a low-rate 
broad-based tax would produce tax increases or 
reductions of less then $ 1 00 . Thi s  figure is less than 
1 0 %  of the tax l iabi l ity for 75 to 80 % of a l l  taxpayers . 
Pechman & S cho l z ,  s upra note 1 6 , at 89 . A move to a 
flat-rate tax would have substantial ly greater impact,  
however, on tax l iabi l ities . See supra text 
accompanying notes 16-24 . 
Subsidizing the production o f  spe c i fied good s ,  through 
favored tax treatment or otherwise , will  typically 
decrease the price o f  the subsidized goods and increase 
the ir output .  The e ffect of the subsidy on price and 
quantity would depend upon the supply and demand 
el asticities of the good . I f  the subsidy were 
repealed,  c eteris paribus ,  the output and price would 
be expected to return to pre subsidy e qu i l ibrium . But 
- 6 9  -
if certai n  f i. r ms were grandfathered so that the 
subsidies would be continued, those fi rms would enjoy 
economic r.ents ( i n thi s  case increased relative value ) . 
For examp l e ,  upon the introduction of a broad­
based income ( or consumption) tax , holders of ass ets 
who se proceeds wil l  not receive tax-favored treatment 
wo uld tend to suffe r  a dec l ine in value as uni form 
unfavorabl e  ( or uni form favorable)  tax treatment i s  
extended t o  investments genera l ly .  This e ffect wil l  he 
explored with r eference to state and local bond s ,  on 
the assumption that interest on such bonds would be 
included in receipts under a broad-based income tax and 
therefore treated similarly to the return on other 
invesunent assets . 
I f  state and local bonds were not protected 
through a g randfathered effective date rule , the value 
o f  the bonds would decl ine relative to other investment 
assets . There would then be no d i fference in the value 
o f  state and local bonds and , for examp l e ,  corporate 
bonds of s imilar risk . Protecting holders of tax­
favored assets by a grandfathered e f fective date , 
however , may result in an increase in value of the 
asset . For examp l e ,  i f  the income tax exclus ion o f  
interest o n  municipal bonds were repe a l ed only for bonds 
issued after the date o f  enactment , inte rest on 
previous ly is sued bonds would remain exempt from 
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ta xation. Be cause bonds are not perpetua l obligat ions , 
once the bonds outstanding as o f  the enactment date 
reach maturity all interest wo uh! be subject to tax . 
The maximum supply of tax- exempt bonds would be fixed as 
of the date of enactment . Since maturity date s for the 
bonds outstanding at that time vary , the supply of 
tax-exempt bonds wo uld subsequently shrink unt i l  a l l  of 
the bonds had matured . With a grandfathered effective 
date . the value o f  outstanding munic ipal bonds would 
rise as higher bracket taxpayers purchased these bonds 
from lower bracket taxpayers .  See L ega l T ransition s ,  
s upra note 1 0 ,  at 60-63 . 
S O .  See BLUEPRINTS , s upra note 9 ,  at 182-8 3 ;  Legal 
Transitions , supra note 1 0 , at 5 0 -5 2 .  See also sources 
c ited supra note 45 ( analys i s  of transi tion problems 




Home B l dg . As s ' n  v. B lais del l ,  2 90 U . S .  3 98 ,  4 3 5  
( 1 934 ) . 
Fairness arguments based upon an i nd ividual ' s  rel iance 
on the status quo tend to concentrate on protec ting only 
those individuals who are nomina l ly affected by a change 
in l aw .  For example,  i n  the case of the exemption of 
5 3 .  
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sta te and local hond in te res t ,  advocates of prote c ting 
lose r s  woulr! only prote ct the holders o f  tax exernpt 
bonds . It has not been suggested,  however, that i ssuers 
o f  these same bond s ,  who may wel l  have st ructured the i r
financing plans on the expectation o f  continued tax
exemption.  are entit led to continuation of the e xemption 
because of the i r  " re l ianc e "  interes t .  Nor has it been 
argued that individual s  who demanded or suppl ied 
substitutes , w ith the as sumption that the exempt ion 
would continue , should also be protected . I f  fairness 
depends upon indiv idual rel iance , all persons who might 
alter the ir behav ior because of a tax rule must be 
protected . 
See genera l ly Consumption Tax I mplementation , s upra 
note 3 4 ,  at 1649-59 ( dis c us s i ng transi tional problems 
with consumpt ion tax) . 
54 . OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET , SPEC IAL ANALYSIS G .  
( Fe deral Budget for 1 982 ) . 
5 5 .  I n  the context o f  a move to an expendi ture tax ,  there 
would be the additional problem of taxing consumption 
from wea l th accumulated after the payment of income 
taxes . Consumption Tax Impl ementation , s upra note 34 , 
at 1 1 5 3 -62 . 
5 6 .  
5 7 .  
5 8 .  





S e e , e . g . ,  JOINT COMMITTE E ,  s upra note 3 ,  at J-8 . 
Id . at J- 2 ;  Aidinoff Testimony , s upra note 8 ,  at 2-5 ; 
Chapoton Te stimony, supra note a ,  at ,J-1 2 to- 1 3 ; Rivlin
Testimony, s upra note 1 0 ,  at J-24 . 
JOINT COMM ITTE E ,  s upra note 3 ,  at J-8 . A similar rule 
was used when the orig inal income tax was enacted in 
1 9 1 3  and when the carryover rule for the bas i s  o f  as sets 
trans ferred at death was enacted i n  1 97 6 .  Tax Reform 
Act of 1 97 6 ,  I . R . C .  § 1 0 2 3  ( repealed 1 980 ) .  Another 
e x ampl e  of spec ial complex grandfather provisions can be 
found in the deprec iation recapture provisions of § 1 2 50 
of the I nternal Revenue Cod e .  I . R . C .  § 1 2 5 0  ( 1 970 & 
Supp . v 1 97 5 )  ( amended by Tax Reform Ac t o f  1 97 6 ,
Pub . L .  N o .  94-45 5 ,  § 202 , 4 0  Stat . 1 52 0 ) . 
Legal T ransitions , s upra note 10 , at 5 0-60 , 64-87 . 
JOINT COMMITTEE , s upra note 3 ,  at J-8 . 
Legal T ransition s ,  s upra note 10 , at 54-6 0 . 
JOINT COMMITTE E ,  s upra note 3 ,  at J-8 . 
63 . 
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The vacati.on p<1y rule w;is o ri9inally made Clpp l i cable to 
tax years a fter .June 3 0 ,  1 95 5 .  Congress subsequently
delayed the e f fective date of vacation pay accr.ual for 
two years in the T e chnical i\menc'lment Act of 1 9 58 , Pub . 
L .  No . 8 -8 5 -866 , § 8 ,  72 Stat.  1 60 8  ( 1 958 ) . Subsequen t­
ly, Cong ress on five other occasions postponed the 
e ffe ctive date of vacation pay accrua l .  Pub . L .  No . 86-
496 , § 2 ,  74 Stat . 1 64 ( 1 960 ) ( extended to Jan . 1 ,
1 96 3 ) ;  Pub . L .  No . 88-1 5 3 , § l , 77 Stat . 272 ( 1 96 3 ) 
( e xtended to Jan . l ,  1 96 5 ) ;  Pub. L .  No . 88-5 5 4 ,  78 Stat 
761 ( 1 964 ) ( extended to Jan .  l ,  1 967 ) ;  Pub.  L .  N o .  
89-6 92 , 80 Stat . 1 0 2 5  ( 1 966 ) ( extended t o  Jan . 1 ,  1 96 9 } ;
P ub .  L .  No . 9 1 - 1 7 2 , § 903 , 83 Stat . 7 1 1  ( 1 96 9 ) 
( extended to Jan . 1 ,  1 97 1 ) .  Congress finally cod i fied 
the vacation pay rule in P ub L. No.  9 3 -6 2 5 , § 4, 88
Stat . 2 108 ( 1 974 ) ( codified at I . R . C .  § 46 3 ) .  Congress
ha s s imi larly extended many other deadlin e s . See , 
�· Tax Re form Act of 1 97 6 , Pub. L .  No.  9 5 -45 5 ,  § 
2 0 3 ( b ) , 90 Stat .  1 52 0  ( amending I . i:t . c .  § 1 6 7 (K }  ( 1 970 & 
Supp . V 1 9 75 ) )  ( e xtension o f  the tax incentive for 
rehabilitation o f  low-income r ental housing ) ; i d .  § 
802 ( a )  ( amending I .  R . C .  § 46 ( 1 970 & Supp . V 1 97 5 ) ) 
( extension o f  1 0 %  investment credit ) ;  i d .  § 2107 ( b )
( amending I . R . C .  § 50 ( B )  ( S upp . V 1 975 ) )  ( extension o f
we l fare emp loyment incentives ) .  
64 . 
6 5 .  
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The precise tax inc reases e s t i.mate<l to result frrorn the 
repeal of the accelera ted <leprecia t ion provis ions which 
would have been e ffec tive und er the Economic Recovery 
Tax Ac t of 1 981 are $ 1 . 5  bil l ion in 1985 and $9 . 9  
bi l l ion in 1 986 . An est imated $ 1 8 . 4  b i l l ion in
increased taxes i s  e xpected to be paid i n  1 987 . STAFF 
OF THE JOINT COMM . ON TAXATION , SUMMARY OF REVENUE 
PROVIS IONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND F ISCAL RESPONS I B ILITY 
ACT OF 1 98 2  ( 1 982 ) ,  r eprinted in 1 6  TAX NOT ES 8 1 1 , 
8 3 6  ( Aug . 3 0 ,  1 982 ) . 
See L egal T rans itions , s upra note 1 0 , at 5 2 -6 0 .  
For examp l e ,  the Treas ury considered a ten-year phase­
in to be an appropriate transitional mechanism in mov ing 
from income to consumption ta xation.  BLUEPRINT S ,  s upra 
note 9 ,  at 205 , 2 0 9- 1 1 ; MEADE REPORT , s upra note 3 4 ,  at 
1 88 .  To minimize " inequitable d istribution e ffects , "  
the Treasury recommended that taxpayers be required to 
compute both income and expenditure tax l iabi l ity and to 
pay the greate r amount for a ten-year period . Both the 
Treasury and the Meade Commission suggestions would 
involve a ten-year phase- in during whi ch ind ividuals 
would be required e ither to compute both income and 
expenditure tax or to make fractional " expenditure tax 
adj ustments" to income tax calcula tions . The Treasury 
67 . 
6 8 . 
6 9 .  
70 . 
7 1 .  
- 7 5  -
dici,  however , s ug9�st that this requ i r � ment might be 
l imitec'l to wea lthiei:- ta xpayers .  BLUEPRLtJ'l'S , s upr� note 
9 ,  at 2 1 4  n . 1 2 . �� _i nfra text accompanying notes 1 73 -
88 . 
S ee supra note 9 anc'l accompanying text . 
See s .  3 250 , 88th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess . ( 1 964 ) . The proposal 
was reintroduced in 1966 . S ee s .  2760 , 8 9 th Cong . , 2 d  
Sess . ( 1 96 6 ) .  See genera l ly B i ttke r ,  An Optional­
S impl i f ied I ncome T ax ? ,  21 TAX L. REV. 1 ( 1 96 5 )  
( critical analysi s  o f  Senator Long ' s proposal s ) ; D odyk , 
Tax S impl i f ication: The Long Amendment and the M i l l s  
P roposal ,  2 5  INST . ON FED . TAX . 1 443 ( 1 96 7 ) ( discus s ion 
of s imp l i fi cation aspects o f  the Long proposa l ) . 
Presumably the one-third o f  these benefits excluded 
from Senator T,ong· s expanded tax base was a rough 
approximation of the return o f  emp loyees '  contr ibu­
tions . See D odyk , s upra note 6 8 ,  at 1 449 n . 1 4 .  
For a criticism o f  the tax base o f  thi s  propo sa l ,  see 
Bi ttke r ,  supra note 6 8 ,  at 1 2 -1 9 .  
1 1 0  Cong .  R e c .  2 3 087-98 ( 1 964 ) ;  1 0 9  C ong . Rec . 1 9706 
( 1 96 3 ) .  For a c riticism o f  the add itional complexity 
7 2 .  
7 3 . 
74 . 
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thi s bill  woul d  have required,  s ee Bi ttke r ,  s upra note 
6 8 .  
UNITED STATES DEPT . OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM 
STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 1 3 2  ( Corrun. P rint 1 96 9 )  [here in­
after c ited as TAX REFORM STUDI E S ] .  See G raet z ,  The 
Evolution of the Tax Shel ter P rovisions of the Tax 
Reform Act o f  1 97 6 : F ewer Than F i fty Ways to L imit 
Your Losse s ,  2 9  U . S . C .  TAX INST . 1 ,  28-39 ( 1 9 77 ) .  
TAX REFORM STUDIES , s upra note 72 , at 1 3 2 .  
Hearing s  b e fore the H o u s e  C omm . o n  Ways and Means 
on the S ub j ect o f  T ax R e form, 9 l st Cong . , 1st Ses s .  
5060-6 3 ,  5 504-05 ( 1 96 9 ) . The first $ 1 0 , 000 o f  
preferences would have been exempt under the Limitation 
on Tax Preference ( LT P )  proposa l .  A f ive-year averaging 
provis ion was a l so includ ed ,  and the proposal was to 
become fully e ffective a fter a three-year transit ional 
period . The fol lowing items wer e  included as tax 
preferences under the LT P p roposa l :  ( 1 )  the apprecia­
tion el ement in the value of property donated to 
char ity ; (2 ) intang ible <'!ri l l ing expense s ;  ( 3 ) the 
excess o f  accelerated over straight- line d epreciation 
on real estate ; and ( 4 ) farm losses generated because 
of the use o f  special accounting rules . The preference 
7 5 .  
7 6 .  
7 7 .  
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ite1ns un.ler the u l  location o f  deductions proposals were 
the four items inc luded under the LTP p roposal p l us tax­
exempt interest and the excluded one-ha l f  of capita l  
gain s .  
H . R .  Rep . No . 41 3 ,  9l st Cong . ,  1 st Sess . 2 ,  reprinted 
in 1 96 9  U . S .  CODE CONG . & AD . NEWS 1646 . 
S .  Rep . No . 5 52 ,  9 l st Cong . ,  1 s t  Sess . 7 ,  reprinted 
in 1 96 9  U . S .  CODE CONG . & AD . NEWS 2041 . The revenue
estimated to be der ived from the Se nate Finance 
Corrunittee min imum tax was approximately the same as 
that antic ipated from the House limit on tax 
pre ferences and al location of deductions provisions . 
However , the S enate version app l ied to both individua l s  
and corporations whi l e  the House version a n d  the 
Treasury p roposal would have app lied only to 
individua l s . 
See 1 1 5  C ong . Rec . 3 8 , 297-300 ( 1 96 9 ) ( remarks o f  
Senator M i l l er ) . The fol lowing nine items of tax 
pre ference were inc luded under the S enate bil l :  ( 1 )  
the excess o f  accelerated depreciation over straight­
l in e  on real estate ; ( 2 )  the e xcess o f  accel erated 
deprec iation over straight- l in e  on personal property 
sub j ect to a net l ease ( 3 )  the excess o f  the deduction 
78 . 
7 9 . 
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for amort ization of pol l ut ion control fac i l ities over 
accelerated d epreciation; (4 ) the e xcess of 
amortization of rai lroad ro l l ing stock over a ccelerated 
depreciation; ( 5 ) the "bargai n e l ement" in qua l ified 
emp l oyee stock opt ions , i . e . ,  the excess o f  the fair 
market value o f  the optioned shares at the time of 
exercise over the option price ; (6 ) the excess o f  the 
bad debt deduction allowed to f i nancial institutions 
over the amount that would have been al lowabl e  on the 
bas i s  of actual exper ience ; ( 7 ) percentage depletion in 
excess o f  the adjusted basis of the prope rty ; ( 8 )  the 
excluded one-ha l f  o f  capital g ai n s ·  and ( 9 )  intangible 
dri l l in g  expenses . 
Tax Re form Ac t o f  1 96 9 ,  Pub . L .  No . 9 1 - 1 72 , § 3 0 1 , 83 
Stat . 487 , ( codi fied as amended at I . R . C .  § §  56-58 
( 1 982 ) ) .  The Conference Committee e l im inated intangible 
dril l ing expenses from the l ist of preferences . A 
seven-year carry-forward of regular income ta xes was 
added in 1 970 , and the Revenue Act of 1 9 7 1  added rapid 
amortization of j ob- training and chi ld- care fac i l ities 
in excess o f  straight- l in e  depreciation as a tax 
preference item. 
In 1 97 3 ,  the T r easury proposed that the minimum tax 
provisions o f  section 56 , as they app l ied to 
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individua l s ,  be replaced by the fol lowing proposa l :  
Th e [M i n imum Taxab l e  I ncome] ( ""1TI " )  
proposal i s  designed to assure tha t  every 
indiv idual w i l l  pay a reasonable amount o f  
fed eral income ta x relat ive t o  the s i ze o f  h i s  
income . Th is wi l l  he accomplished by r'�qlli r ing 
that every individua l ' s taxable income , to whi ch 
the present graduat"'d tax rates are app l iecl , be 
no less than his 11 m inimum taxah l e  income, 11 which 
is approximately one-hal f  of his adj usted gross 
income expanded to include speci fied tax 
preferences which represent exc lus ions from income 
under present l aw .  
The min imum taxab l e  income wil 1 be determined 
as fol lows : ( i )  By adding to present law 
adjusted gross i ncome the total percentage 
dep l etion in excess of bas i s , the excluded one­
hal f  of net long-term capital gains , exempt 
earned income from foreign sources , and the non­
taxab l e  bargain e l ement in certain stock options 
to arrive at E xpanded Adjusted Gross Income 
( EAGI ) ;  ( i i )  By subtracting from EAGI . the 
deductions for personal exemptions , a $ 1 0 , 000 
f loor , extraordinary medical expenses , extra­
ordinary casualty l osses and investment interest 
( and investment expens e s )  to the e xtent of i nvest­
ment income to arrive at the MT! Bas e ;  and ( i i i )  
B y  dividing the resulting MTI Base by two to 
arrive at 11 minimurn taxab l e  income. 11 Every 
individual will be required to pay tax on the 
g reater of h i s  minimum taxab l e  i ncome or his 
normal taxable income computed in the �sual 
man ne r .  
The spec i fied exclus ions and a ll itemized 
deductions w i l l  be permitted to operate freely 
within the area of up to one-ha l f  of income , but 
in all events the other one-ha l f  of income wi l l  be 
subj ect to income tax .  Be cause o f  the $ 1 0 , 000 
f loor ,  the adjustments for extraord inary medical 
expenses and casualty losses and other r easons , 
MT! w i l l  have l ittle or no impact on taxpayers in 
income brackets be low $ 5 0 , 000 . 
MT! is not a form of a " minimum tax" like the 
provision in present l aw which imposes a flat 10 
percent tax on spec i fied " tax preferences . "  
Instead, MT! w i l l  be part o f  the regular income 
tax structure in which the rates of tax range 
from 14 to 70 percent . MT! w i l l  be a more
80 . 
8 1 . 
82 . 
8 3 .  
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effective solut ion , consiste nt wi.th our graduate<'! 
ta x rate system, to the problem to which both MT1 
and the present Minimum Tax are d irected . 
Limitation on Arti ficial Accounting Los ses , 1 97 3 : 
H earings on G eneral T ax R e form B e fore House C omm .  
on Ways and M eans , 9 3 d  Cong . , l st Se s s .  ( 1 973 ) 
( testimony o f  George P. Schu l t z ,  Secretary of the 
Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Schultz Testimony] . 
I n  1 974 , an influential group o f  Congressmen j oined 
forces to endorse increas e s  in the 1969 minimum tax as 
the ma jor tax reform item on their agend a .  The se 
proposal s  took an entirely different approach from the 
Treasury MT! proposal and formed the basis for the 1 9 7 6  
amendments . In genera l ,  they would have revised the 
minimum tax provisions by : ( a ) el iminating the 
deduction for regular income taxes · ( b )  reducing the 
exemption from $ 30 , 000 to $ 10 , 000 ; and ( c )  replacing the 
10 percent rate with a g raduated scale o f  rate s ,  for 
examp l e ,  from 1 0 %  to 2 0 % .  
Pub . L .  N o .  9 4  4 5 5 , § 301 , 90 Stat . 1 54 9 , 1 5 50 ( 1 97 6 ) 
( amending I . R . C .  § §  56-58 ) .
Id . 
See I . R . c .  § 56 ( 1 96 9 )  ( amended 1 982 ) . 
84 . 
8 5 . 
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See I . R. C .  § 56 ( 1 97 6 )  ( amended 1 982 ) . 
See G raetz , su� note 7 2 ,  at 9 .  I n  1 96 9 ,  § 1 348 was
added to the I nternal Revenue Cod e ,  providing ( effec tive 
in 1 97 1 ) a maximum 5 0 %  rate of tax on earned income . 
The purpose o f  the maximum tax on earned income was to 
reduce the incentives for individuals with substantial 
earned income to engage in ta x shelter activities or 
other forms o f  tax planning . Thi s  was supposed to be 
accomp l ished not only by a d irect reduction in the 
maximum rate o f  tax on earning s  but a l so by a so- cal l ed 
preference offset,  which had the e ffect of reducing the 
amount of earned income eligible for the max imum tax by 
the individua l ' s tax preferences for the current yea r .  
T a x  preferences f o r  thi s  purpose were the same as under 
the minimum tax o f  § 56 , and thus , unti l the Revenue Act
of 1 9 7 8 ,  an ind ividual might pay increased taxes on 
earned income because o f  the real ization o f  long-term 
capi tal gain s .  Since the deductiion under § 1 2 02 for
one-ha l f  of long-term capital gains was a preference 
which r educed the amount of earned income e l i g ible for 
the special 5 0 %  rate , an individual el igible for the 5 0 %  
max imum rate mi ght , f o r  examp l e ,  f ind that his earned 
income was taxed at 7 0 %  rather than 5 0 % .  I f  the tax 





additional tax on capital gains , it coulcl have had the 
e ffect o f  increasing the ind ividua l ' s e ffective rate o f  
tax on capital gains b y  a s  much a s  1 0 % .  ( In cer. tain 
rar e  case s ,  under the 1 96 9  Act, because of the treatment 
of tax pre ferences under the max imum tax, the max imum 
rate on capital gains could reach 54 . 5 % .  Th i s  was 
changed by the 1 97 6  leg i s l ation ) . The Revenue Act o f  
1 978 , however , removed the capital g ains t a x  preference 
as an offset to the amount of earned income otherwise 
el igib l e  for the 5 0 %  maximum tax rate . Thus , the 50 % 
rate applied to earned income regard less of the 
individual ' s  capital gains for the year . Other tax 
preferences , however, continued to reduce the amount o f  
earned income e l ig ible for the spec ial maximum rate . 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM ON TAXAT IOril , 9 6 th CONG . ,  1 st 
SESS . ,  GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1 97 8 ,  
a t  1 5-1 7 ,  2 5 1 -57 ( Comm. P rint 1 97 8 )  [hereinafter cited 
as EXPLANAT ION OF 1 978 ACT ] .  
I . R . C .  § §  5 7 ,  1 2 0 2  ( amended by the Revenue Act o f  l 978 ) . 
A 70% tax rate 
ordinary income 
the top rate then applicable to 
appl ied to 4 0 %  of long-term capital 
gain is equival ent to a tax of 28% of the entire gain . 
EXPLANATION OF 1 978 ACT , s upra note 86 , at 262 . 
3 9 .  
90 . 
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I . R . C .  § 55 ( addecl hy the Revenue l\ c t  of 1 978 ) .  See
���ral�� EXPLANATIOril OF 1978 ACT , s upra note 86 , at 
2 6 2 -6 7  ( tax re form des igned to curta i l  cleductions and 
exclusions by h i gh- income taxpayer s ) . Coven , The 
A l ternative M inimum T ax :  P roving Again that Two Wrongs 
Do Not Make A R igh�, 68 CALI F .  L .  REV. 1 093 ( 1 980 ) 
( arguing that the alternative tax is inherently 
inequitable and unduly comp l icated ) .  
The Staff o f  the Joint Committee on Taxation des cribed 
the provis ion as fo l l ows : 
The alternative minimum tax is based on the s um o f
a noncorporate taxpayer ' s  gross income reduced by 
d eductions allowed for the year ( including 
deductions i n  excess of gross income, i f  any) , and 
by amounts included in income under section 6 6 7  
( re l ating to accumu lation d istributions from 
trust s ) , and increased by the amount of the 
taxpayer ' s  adjusted itemized deductions , and 
capital gains deductio n .  Thi s  amount then is 
subj ec t to the fo llowing alternative minimum tax 
rate s :  
Alternative minimum taxable income P ercent 
$ 0  to $ 20 , 000 0 
$20 , 000 to 60 , 0 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 10 
$60 , 000 to 1 0 0 , 000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 20 
Over $ 1 00 , 000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 2 5  
The resul ting amount then is compared to 
regular tax l iabi l ity, as increased by the add-on 
minimum tax .  * * * I f  alternative minimum tax 
liabil ity exceeds regular income tax l iabi l ity , 
as increased by the add-on minimum tax , the 
greater amount is payab le . 
Thus , although the tax is in e ffect a true 
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alternative tax , in the sense that it i.s pain
only when it exceeds regular tax ( inclu<'!ing any 
add-on minimum tax l iabi l ity ) , as a technical 
matte r, the taxpayer ' s  regular and add- on minimum 
taxes continue to be imposed and the amount of 
alternative minimum tax is the excess of the 
amount computed under the altel'."nati.ve min imum tax 
rate table over the amount of the regular and add­
on minimum taxes . 
For purposes o f  the alte rnative minimum tax 
there are two preferences . The capital gains pre­
ference is the amount of a taxpaye r ' s section 
1202 capital gains deduction, but does not 
inc lude any deduction whi ch is attributable to 
the gain from sale of a taxpayer ' s  principal 
residence . 
The other alternative minimum tax preference 
is adjusted itemize<'! deductions . Thi s  pre ference 
excl udes med ical and casualty d eductions , s tate 
and local tax deductions and, in the case o f  
income in respect o f  a necedent , amounts deducted 
( under § 6 9 1  ( c ) ) for estate taxes . . . . The 
remaining itemized d eductions are preferences 
only to the extent they exceed 60 percent o f  
ad justed gross income minus the medical and 
casualty deduction s , State and local tax 
neductions , and the deduction for estate taxes 
attributable to the inclus ion of income in 
respect o f  a decedent in a decedent ' s  gross 
estate . 
The foreign tax credit and l'."efundable credits 
are the only tax credits which are al lowed 
against any a l ternative minimum tax liabi l i ty . 
Th us , taxpayers paying the al tel'."nati ve mi numurn 
tax do not obtain the benefit of nonrefundable 
credits , other than the foreign tax credit , to 
the extent of the minimum tax .  However , in the 
case of the investment tax credit , the j obs 
credit, and the WIN credit,  the Act pl'."ovides tha t 
any credit carryover or carryback from a year in 
whi ch the taxpayer i s  liable for some amount o f  
altel'."native minimum tax ,  i s  not t o  be reduce<'! to 
the extent o f  the taxpayer ' s  al ternative min imum 
tax liability.  ( Footnote omitte<1 ) . 
EXPLANATION OF 1 978 ACT , s upra note 86 , at 262-6 7 .  The 
alternative minimum tax o f  section 55 was arnenden in 
9 1  
9 2 . 
9 3 . 
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1 980 to pe rmit nonrefundab le tax cl'."ed its,  other than the 
foreign ta >< cl'."ed it , to o ffset a lte rnative minimum ta x 
l iab i l it y ,  except to the e>< tent attr ibutable to capital
gains or adjusted itemize<'! deductions .  Pub . L. No . 
96-2 2 2 ,  § 104 ( a )  (4 ) ,  94 Stat . 2 1 5  ( 1 980 ) . 
Pub . L .  No . 97-3 4 ,  § §  1 0 1 , 1 02 ,  95 S tat . 1 76 ( 1 981 ) .
Under the 1 981 Act, the al ternative minimum tax rates 
were 1 0 %  on amounts from $ 20 , 000 to $ 6 0 , 000 and 2 0 %  on 
aMOunts over $ 60 , 00 0 .  The special 5 0 %  maximum rate on 
eal'."ned income was repealen by the 1981 legis lation in 
connection with the reduction of the overal l top rate 
from 70% to 5 0 % .  
Pub . L .  No . 97-248,  § 2 0 1 , 5 1  U . S . L . W . 1 0  ( Sept 1 4 ,
1 982 ) . See I . R. C .  § 55 ( amended by the Tax Equity and
Fi scal Responsibility Tax Act of 1 982 ) . The exemption 
of $ 3 0 , 00 0  applies to unmarried individua l s '  a $40 , 000 
exemption i s  appl icable to married couples f i l ing j oint 
returns . 
For an artic l e  that shares the premise that the minimum 
tax provision provides a satis factory transitional 
mechanism to broad-based ta x re form, see Hobbet, 
T ransitional Mechanisms to F ac i l i tate Tax Reform, 34 
• 
LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS . 8 1 8  ( 1 969 ) .
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9 4 .  S e e  Bradford Testimony, �r� note 1 9 ,  a t  5-7 ; Chapoton 
Testimony, s upra note 8 ,  at J-1 0 ;  P echman & S cho l z ,
supra note 1 6 ,  at 83 . For a d is cuss io n  of some o f  he 
problems resulting from the rate structure o f  the 
alternative minimum tax ,  see Coven , s upra note 89 , at 
9 5 .  
96 . 
1097 . 
See s upra text accompanying notes 8 3 -8 9 . 
At the time when the broad base is made g enerally 
app l icable,  some restriction on the d eductibi l ity o f  
capital losses wi ll have t o  be considered i f  individua l s  
with portfo l ios containing gains and losses are t o  he 
prec luded from e l iminating the i r  tax l iabi l ity by 
realizin g  losses only and o f fsetting them against 
ord inary income . Thi s  prob lem does not ar ise under the 
minimum tax because it app l ies only when the tax exceeds 
the regular tax which l imits d eduction o f  capital losses 
against ordinary income . 
9 7 .  I .  R .  C .  § 5 5 ( e )  ( 1 ) ( B )  ( 1 98 2 )  . 
9 8 .  I . R . C .  § §  S S ( e ) ( l ) ( A ) . ( C ) , 1 6 5 , 2 1 3  ( 1 982 ) . These
latter provisions l imit deductions for medical expenses 
and casualty losses to the excess over 10% o f  adj usted 
9 9 .  
1 00 . 
1 0 1 . 
1 02 . 
1 0 3 . 
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gross i n come . 
I . R . C .  § 55 ( e ) ( 3 ) ,  ( 4 )  ( 1 982 ) .  No deduction is a l l owed
for interest on loans made after July 1 ,  1 98 2  for 
refinancing the taxpayer ' s  home . I d .  
The l imitation t o  net investment income i s  modeled 
after § 1 6 3 ( d )  o f  the I nternal Revenue Code,  ori g inally 
enacted in 1 969 . For a discus s ion of the reasons for 
this provi s ion, see Halperin,  Capital Gains and 
O rdinary D eductions: N egative I ncome Tax for the 
Wealthx, 1 2  B . C .  INDUS . & COM . L .  REV . 3 8 7 ,  3 88-90
( 1 97 1 ) .  
I . R . C .  § 44 ( F )  ( 1 982 ) . 
I . R . C .  § 44 ( E ) ( 1 982 ) .
I . R . C .  § 44 ( C )  ( 1 982 ) .
1 04 .  I . R . C .  § 44 ( B )  ( 1 982 ) .
1 0 5 .  I . R . C .  § 40 ( 1 982 ) .
1 0 6 . I . R . C .  § 44 ( A )  ( 1 982 ) . 
1 0 7 .  
1 0 8 .  
1 0 9 .  
1 1 0 .  
1 1 1 .
- 88 -
I . R . C .  § 37 ( 1 982 ) . 
I . R . C .  § 38 ( 1 982 ) . 
See I . R . C .  § 57 ( 1 982 ) . The fo llowing items o f
prefe rence a r e  add ressed b y  the Code ' s prov isions : ( 1 )  
exclusions from gross income for dividend s and intere st; 
( 2 )  accelerated depreciation on real property ; ( 3 ) 
accelerated depreciation on leased personal property ; 
( 4 )  amortization of certi fied pol lution control 
fac i l ities ;  ( 5 ) deductions for mining exploration and 
development costs ; ( 6 )  deductions for circula tion and 
research and experimental e xpenditures ; ( 7 )  depletio n ;  
( 8 )  capital gains ; ( 9 ) the bargain element o f  incentive 
stock options ; ( 1 0 ) intangible d r i l l ing costs ; and ( 1 1 ) 
accelerated cost recovery deductions in excess o f  
spec i f ied allowances . 
I . R . C .  § 57 ( a ) ( 8 ) ,  ( 1 1 ) ( 1 98 2 ) .
I . R . C .  § 5 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ,  ( 5 ) .
1 1 2 .  The impact o f  the minimum tax o n  such d e ferral items i s  
typica l ly s o  severe when i t  applies that taxpayers 
would be better off foregoing the defe rral provision 
altogether . 
1 1 3 .  
1 14 . 
1 1 5 .  
1 1 6 .  
1 1 7 .  
1 1 8 .  
1 1 9 .  
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See ,JO HIT cml•HT T E E ' �UJ2.1:.� note 3 '  at J-8 to-9 . 
Thi s  is not true if a flat-rate consumption, rather
than income, tax were desired . See i n fra text 
accompanying notes 1 7 3 -88 . 
For more comprehensive discus sion,  see the sources 
cited �ra note 9 .  
S ee general ly P echman & S chol z ,  s upra note 1 6
( calculation o f  the revenue .impact o f  various 
pre ferences )  . 
I . R . C .  § §  103 , 1 0 3 ( A )  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
For a more general d iscus sion of limitation o f  
preference items . see supra notes 7 2 -7 8  and 
accompanying te xt; S ENATE REPORT ON TAX EQUITY AND 
FISCAL RESPONS IBILITY ACT OF 1 98 2 ,  S .  REP . NO . 4 9 4 ,  
9 7 th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess . 1 1 0 ,  reprinted i n  1 98 2  U . S .  CODE 
CONG . & AD . NEWS 1 0 1 -0 2  [hereinafter c ited as SENATE
REPORT ON 1 98 2  ACT ] .  
But c f .  I . R . C .  § 2 9l ( a ) ( 3 ) ( inclus ion o f  tax- exempt 
interest as preference for c erta i n  financial 
inst itutions . )  
1 2 0 . 
1 2 1 . 
- <JO -
S e e ,  e .�._, H . R . REP .  No . 4 1 3 ,  9 l s t  Cong . , l st Sess . 7 2 -
74 ( 1 96 9 )  ( proposing e l ection t o  is sue taxable honds 
with an interest subsidy from the federal gover nment) · 
BLUEPRINTS , s u� note 9 ,  at 85 ( proposal for a federal 
interest subsidy to state and local governments ) .  To 
the extent tha t  dir ect subsidies are requi red to 
replace ta x preferences e l iminated by base-broadening , 
additional revenues wi l l  not be avai lab l e  to faci litate 
rate reductions . As a resu l t ,  rates somewhat higher 
than otherwise necessary may be required.  None o f  the 
author ities discuss ing tax rates app licable to a 
broadened tax base c ited in thi s  Article makes a ny 
adjustment for potenti a l  direc t  subsi dies . 
I . R . C .  § l O l ( a ) ( 1 982 ) . 
1 2 2 .  S e e  Consumption Tax Impl ementation , s upra note 3 4 ,  at 
1 2 3 . 
1 6 1 1 -1 2 .  
S e e ,  e . g. , Graetz, Taxation o f  Unreal ized Gains at 
Death -- An Evaluation of the C urrent P roposals , 59 VA . 
L .  REV . 830 ( 1 973 ) ;  Kurtz & Su rrey , Reform o f  Dea�h and
G i ft Taxes:  The 1 968 T reasury P roposa l s ,  The 
Criticisms , and A Rebuttal , 70 COLUM . L. REV. 1 3 6 5
( 1 970 ) . 
1 2 4 .  
1 2 5 . 
1 2 6 .  
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��<: P ub .  L .  No . 9 6 -2 2 3 ,  § 40 l ( a ) , 94 Stat . 2 9 9  ( 1 980 ) 
( repeal ing I . R . C .  § 1 0 2 3 ) .  See a l so I . R . C .  § 1 0 1 4  
( 1 982 ) ( basis o f  property acqu ir ed from decedent ) .  
Unreal ized appreciation o f  assets donated to char ity 
was included as a preference under the min imum tax in 
the 1 96 9  proposa l s .  See supra note 74 . 
For an argument in favor o f  incl uding amounts received 
by g i ft or bequest in income , see generally Dodge ,  
B eyond E state and G ift T ax R eform: I ncluding G i fts and 
�uests i n  I n come , 91 HARV. L .  REV . 1 1 77 ( 1 978 ) . 
1 2 7 .  I . R . C .  § 7 9  ( 1 982 ) .  An employer ' s  payments o f  premiums
1 28 . 
1 2 9 .  
for up to $ 5 0 , 000 o f  group term l i fe insurance are 
exc ludable from an employee ' s  income . 
I . R. C .  § 1 0 6  ( 1 982 ) . I n  certain cases employees may 
exc lude amounts provided by employers in the form o f  
hea l th insurance premiums a n d  reimbursements o f  an 
emp l oyee ' s  uninsured medical expens es . 
I . R . C .  § 1 0 4 ( a )  ( 1 982 ) . Subj ec t to dol lar l imitations 
and other requirements ,  d isabi l ity payments under an 
emp l oyer- f inanced acc ident or health p lan may be 
excluded f rom an emp loyee ' s  income . I . R . C .  § 104 ( a )  ( 3 )  
1 30 . 
1 3 1 . 
1 3 2 .  
1 3 3 .  
1 3 4 .  
1 3 5 .  
1 3 6 .  
- 9 2  -
( 1 982 ) .
I . R . C .  § 1 2 0  ( 1 982 ) . Amounts contributed by an
employer to a prepaid legal services plan for emp loyees 
and the value of l egal services received under such a 
plan are exc luded from employees ' income under certain 
conditions . 
I . R . C .  § §  74 , 1 1 7 ( 1 982 ) .  Scholarships and fel lowships
are genera lly e xcluded from gross income, and pri zes 
and awards are excluded i n  certa i n  l imited 
circumstances .  
I . R . C .  § 9 1 1  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
I .  R . C .  § 1 1 2  ( 1 98 2 ) ( combat pay) : i d .  § 1 1 3
( mustering-out pay ) ; id . § 1 2 2  ( un iformed services
retirement pay) . 
I . R . C .  § 104 ( a )  ( 1 982 ) . 
I . R . C .  § 107 ( 1 982 ) . 
I . R . C .  § 1 6 8  ( 1 982 ) .  S e e  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM . ON 
TAXATION 97th Cong . , l st Ses s .  ( 1 981 ) ,  GENERAL 
EXPLANAT ION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1982 , 
1 3 7 . 
1 3 8 .  
1 3 9 .  
140 . 
1 4 1 . 
142 . 
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at 6 7 -1 00 ( Comm. P r i nt 1981 ) .
Warren & Auerbach, Tran�ferab i l ity of T ax I ncentives and
the Fiction of S a fe Harbor L easing ,  9 5  HARV . L .  REV . 
1 75 2 , 1 75 3  ( 1 982 ) .  See als� Samuelson , Tax 
D eductibi l ity of E conomic D epreciation to E nsure 
I nvariant Valuations , 7 2  J .  POL . ECON . 604 , 606 (1 964 ) 
( d eduction of economic depreciation conforms to income 
d e finit ion and leaves investment choices among assets 
unaffected) . 
I . R . C .  § 5 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) . ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 1 2 ) ( 1 982 ) . 
Hul ten & Wykof f ,  The Measurement of E conomic Deprecia­
tion, in DEPREC IATION , INFLAT ION AND THE TAXATION OF 
INCOME FROM CAPITAL 82 ( C .  Hu l ten ed . 1 98 1 ) .  
C rane v .  Commi ssioner , 3 3 1  U . S .  1 ( 1 947 ) . 
See Bradford , The E conomics of Tax Pol icy Toward 
S avings, i n  THE GOVERNMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11 ( G .  
Von Furstenberg ed . 1 980 ) ;  Warren & Auerbach, supra 
note 1 3 7 ,  at 1 7 5 7 . 
See Shultz Testimony, supra note 7 9 , at 6879-8 0 . The 
new treatment o f  net operating l osses under the 1 982 
1 43 . 
1 44 .  
1 45 . 
1 46 .  
1 47 . 
1 48 .  
1 4 9 .  
- 9 4  -
minimum tax amendments aoes not a ccomp lish th is result 
in all case s ,  but does reduce il. l lowable losses by items 
o f  tax pre ference . SENATE REPORT ON 1 982 ACT ,  s u�i::_� 
note 1 1 8 ,  at 1 1 1-1 2 ,  1 98 2  U . S . CODE CONG . & AD . NEWS at
1 0 1 -0 2 . This provision would increase in e f fectiveness 
as the list of tax pre ference items becomes more 
comprehensive. 
See Graetz , s upra note 7 2 , at 48-5 0 .  
See I . R . C .  §§  5 5 ( e ) ( 3 ) ( B )  ( e ) -( 5 )  ( 1 982 )  ( following 
an approach containea in § 1 6 3 ( d )  ( 1 982 ) ) .  
I . R . C .  § 1 83 ( 1 982 ) .  
I . R . C .  § 2 80 ( A )  ( 1 982 ) .  
See S chulz Testimony, supra note 7 9 , at 687 9-00 . 
See general ly G raet z ,  supra note 7 2 ,  at 48-50 
( d iscussion of l imitation of tax she l ter dec'!uctions to 
relatea income) . 
The d i s cussion of nonstatutory f ringe benefits is based 
upon a similar d is cuss ion of this i ssue in Grae t z ,  
Expenditure Tax D esig_n ,  i n  WHAT SHOULD B E  TAXED : 
1 50 .  
1 51 .  
- 9 5  -
HlCOME OR CXP E�l!HTURE ? ,  ��ra not·� 3 6 , at l n l ,  2 1 0 -1 3 .  
��e���� S imp l i f i cat ion Corrunit tee , s u�� note 9 ,  at 
5 7 8  ( the va lue o f  fringe benefits must be A l located 
between personal and business benefi.t with the former 
inc ludible as income) . 
I . R . C .  § 1 1 9  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
The horizonta l equity standard is violated whenever the 
availab i l ity of tax- free compensation varies s ignifi­
cantly among j obs for example , as between union and 
nonunion worker s .  S imilar ly ,  t o  the extent that the 
taxation o f  an item depends upon whether it is furni shed 
by emp l oyer s ,  whether employers reimburse emp loyee s '  
expenses i n  obta ining the item, o r  whether employees 
bear the costs of the item directly , horizontal equity 
wi l l  typica l ly be violated . Close coordination i s  
therefore requ i red between rules that include employee 
benefits in the tax base and those that allow employees 
or self-employed persons to aeduct i tems of compensation 
as business expenses . Particular care will have to be 
exercisea under a broad- based income tax to prevent 
highly compensated persons from structu ring thei r  
remuneration so as t o  receive a maximum amount o f  
compensation i n  the form o f  fringe benefits . 
Moreover , when s i gni ficant amounts o f  compensation 
1 52 .
1 5 3 . 
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are e xc luded from the tax bas e ,  employers are given an 
incentive to provide s uch compensation. For examp l e ,  if 
employee s were subj ected to a 25% marginal tax 
rate , they would prefer $ 7 6  o f  tax- free compensation in 
kind to $ 1 00 of taxable wages . Employers would l ikewise 
prefer paying $ 7 6  to paying $ 100 , s ince there would be 
no di ffe rence in tr eatment at the emp loyer l evel . The 
lower relative cost o f  in-kind benefits produces 
economi c b iases , which induce employees to take a 
significant proportion of their compensation in the 
form of excluded benefits . By the same token , such 
e xclus ions tend to induce labor to shi ft to s i tuations 
amenable to the provis ion o f  excluded compensation.  
Under the e xisting income tax , the I nternal Revenue Code 
and current regulations are overly broad and largely 
uninformati ve. Little publ ished guidance is avai lable 
to e ither taxpayers or revenue agents . A d iscussion 
draft of proposed regu lations relating to fringe 
bene fits was publ ished i n  1975 by the Treasury but was 
subsequently withdrawn, and the I nternal Revenue Service 
has recent ly been precluded by Congress from publ ishing 
either a comprehensi ve set of regu lations or a complete 
set of exrunples through issuance of revenue rul ings . 
A benefit provided at the employer ' s  place of business 
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shoulr'l be more U.i<ely to be charar. te r ize<'l as a working 
cond i t ion , but this shou ld not be determinative.  Other 
relevant factors , none of which a l one should be determi-
nat ive, inc lude the fol lowing :  ( 1 )  D i d  the emp loyee 
have an option to accept or r e j ect �le good or service? 
If so, thi s  would argue for inclusion. ( 2 )  Was the 
good or service something that the employee would 
normally pay for out of after-tax dollars? I f  so,  thi s 
would argue for inc luding the amount as compensation . 
( 3 )  Was the good or service provided to the employee ' s
family? I f  so, it would most likely be regarded as 
compensation. ( 4 )  Was the good or service provided 
routinely or only sporad ical ly? I f  the former , 
inquiries should be made to determine whether it was 
part o f  the negotiated wage structure and ther e fore 
something the employee e xpected as compensation. 
To convert such gen eral principles into a workabl e  
system, Congress or the T r easury must provide a 
reasonably comprehensive set o f  examp les ind icating 
whether particular goods or services are includable in 
an employee ' s  receipts and, if so, at what val ue . De 
minimis rules and reasonable rules for the valuation ��- -�  
and al location of fringe benefits are a l so essential to 
e f fective fringe benefit taxation.  If  the principles 
des cribed above were adopted , items such as supper 
money, emp loyee discounts , f ree admission to athletic 
1 54 .  
1 5 5 . 
1 5 6 .  
1 5 7 .  
1 58 .  
1 59 .  
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or entertainment events , employees ' use of vacat i o n  
fac i l ities and country club memberships , mea l s  and 
lodging provided to employees ,  and interest- free l oans 
provided to emp l oyee s would be includab l e  in income tax 
rece ipts . 
Pub .  L .  No . 97-248,  § §  2 3 5 - 2 54 , 51 u . s .L . W .  1 0  ( Sept . 
1 4 ,  1 982 ) . 
See I . R. C .  §§ 4 0 1 -41 5 ( 1 98 2 ) ( deferred compensation,
pension, profit sharing, and other benefits partia l ly 
exc luded from tax liab i l ity ) . 
I . R . C .  § 2 1 9  ( 1 982 ) .
BLUEPRINTS , supra note 9 ,  at 5 6 -5 8 .
S ee ,  e . g . , id . ( emp loyer contributions to pension 
fund exc luded from emp loyees '  tax base) . I f  receipts 
are included in ful l ,  deductions should be a l lowed for 
individual s '  contr ibut ions to such plan s ;  otherwise a 
portion of the receipt should be excluded . See s upra 
note 6 9 .  
Despite the absence o f  specific statutory author ity, the 
long-standing pol icy o f  the I nternal Revenue Service has 
1 60 . 
1 61 . 
1 62 .  
1 6 3 . 
1 64 .  
- 9 9  -
been to exc l i.Hle payments r.ece iverl un1ler wel fare
legis lation from inc0me . ����-:_�·- · Rev. Ru l .  7 2 -605 , 
1 97 2 -2 C . B .  3 5  ( veterans ' benefi ts ) ;  Rev. Ru l .  70-280 ,
1 97 0 -1 C . B .  1 3  ( unemployment benefits ) ;  Rev .  Ru l .  
7 0 -2 1 7 ,  1 970-1 C . B .  1 2  ( social security payments) . 
I f  such payments were not inc luded in the income tax 
base , advatanges would result to recipients depending on 
the ir marginal tax brackets , with higher bracket tax­
payers obta in ing a relatively g reater advantage from 
exclus ion . Where ind ividual s  contribute to such plans , 
however, d eductions should be al lowed . See Sunley, 
Employee B enefits and T ransfer P ayments , i n  
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION ,  supra note 9 ,  at 7 6 -7 7 . 
R .  MUSGRAVE & P .  MUSGRAVE PUBLIC F INANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 270-71 ( 1 9 73 ) . 
BLUEPRINTS , s upra note 9 ,  at 6 9 ;  C .  MCLURE , supra note 
3 4 ,  at 1 46-8 4 ;  l�arren , s upra note 3 4 ,  at 7 3 9-41 . 
c .  MCLURE , supra note 3 4 ,  at 2 1 5 - 1 9 ;  Warren, s upra note 
34 , at 740 . 
Chapoton Testimony , supra note 8 ,  at J-1 6 ;  Consumption 
Tax I mplementation , s upra note 34 , at 1 634-42 . 
1 6 5 .  
1 66 . 
1 6 7 .  
1 6 8 .  
1 6 9 .  
1 70 . 
- 1 0 0  -
MEADE REPORT , supra note 3 4 ,  at 2 3 3 -3 5 .  
C .  MCLURE , supra note 34 , at 6 ;  Warren, supra note 
34 , at 7 3 6-3 8 .  
Bradley-G ephardt, s upra note 3 .  But see supra note 3 0  
( S enator Bradley and Represe ntative Gephardt have 
indicated that a corporate taxation bi ll wi ll be 
introduced in the Ninety-E ighth Congress ) .  The Chairman 
of the Tax Section of the Amer ican Bar Assoc iation has 
simi l ar ly concluded that " adoption of a flat- rate tax 
for individuals cannot be considered apart from the 
taxation o f  bus iness entitites . "  Aidinoff Testimony, 
supra note 8 ,  at 9 .  
I . R . C .  § l ( f ) , added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act o f
1981  currently provides f o r  such indexation e f fective 
beginning in 1 985 . 
For a more deta i l ed d iscus sion of the indexation issue , 
see INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX ( H .  Aaron ed . 1 97 6 ) ;  
MEADE REPORT , supra note 34 , at 99-1 2 2 ; S implifi cation 
Committe e ,  s upra note 9 ,  at 589 . 
See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying te x t .  See a l so - ----
1 71 . 
1 7 2 .  
1 73 .  
l 74 . 
- 1 0 1  -
Chapoton Te stimony , ��ra note 8, at J-10 to-1 1
( d iscus s ion o f  rl istribut ional e f fe cts o f  d i f ferent rate
structu res ) . 
E . g . , Bradford Test imony, �ra note 19 at 5-7 ; Pechman 
& Scholz , s upra note 1 6 , at 8 5 .  
Bradley-G ephard t ,  �ra note 3 .  
S ee generall_X J .  DUE , SALES TAXATION ( 1 95 7 ) ;  MEADE
REPORT , supra note 3 4 ,  at 22 8-45 ; Consumption T ax 
Implementation , supra note 34 , at 1 5 78-80 . 
See J .  DUE , su� note 1 7 3 , at 3 74 -7 5 .  
1 7 5 .  Consumption T ax Implementation , s upra note 3 4 ,  at 1 5 77-
1 7 6 .  
l 77 . 
7 8 .  See also sources c ited supra note 36 ( discuss ing 
the advantages and d i sadvantages of an income tax 
versus a personal tax on consumption) . 
N .  KALDOR, AN EXP ENDITURE TAX 2 2 4  ( 1 95 5 ) .
Andrews , A S upplemental P ersonal E xpenditure T a x ,  in 
WHAT S HOULD BE TAXE D :  INCOME O R  EXPENDITURE? ,  supra 
note 3 6 ,  at 1 2 9 .  
1 7 8 .  
1 7 9 .  
1 80 .  
1 8 1 . 
1 82 .  
183 . 
1 84 .  
1 85 . 
1 86 .  
- 1 0 2  -
I d .  at 1 3 7 - 3 9 .  
I d .  at 142-5 0 . 
MEADE REPORT , supra note 3 4 ,  at 204-1 5 ,  442-46 . 
I d .  at 2 1 3 .  
Andrews , supra note 1 7 7 . at 1 4 1 . 
s .  LODIN,  supra note 3 6 ,  at 1 2 3 . 
BLUEPRINTS , supra note 9 ,  at 20 9 .  
I d .  a t  2 0 5 ,  209-1 1 ,  2 1 4  n . 12 .  The Meade Corruniss ion 
also suggests the possibility of phasing-in the 
expenditure tax by s ubsti tuting an additional one-tenth 
of the expenditure tax base for the income base each 
year for ten years . MEADE REPORT , supra note 3 4 ,  at 
1 88 .  
I too have argued e l sewhere that a graduated
expenditure ta x might be used as a minimum tax .  
Graetz , supra note 7 2 ,  at 53 . For thi s  purpose an 
expenditure tax should be an alte rnative to the income 
ta x - ·  payab l e  by taxpayers with substantial incomes 
1 8 7 . 
- 1. 0 3  -
( say over $ 3 0 , 000 ) whenever it e xceeds the regular 
income tax liah i l  i ty -- not a tax genera lly app licable 
to a l l  upper- income taxpayer s in l ieu of the income 
ta x ,  as recommended by P ro fes sor Andrews . 
I f  a progressive broad-based tax on consumption were 
des i red by the Congre s s ,  it would be pos s ible to 
approach such a change by replacing the alternative 
minimum tax adopted in the 1 98 2  legis lation with an 
al ternative minimum tax based on consumpt ion and then 
to extend the consumption tax to a l l  taxpayers .  Such a 
course o f  action would not be an extension o f  the 
present minimum tax ,  but would require the substitution 
o f  a d i f ferent minimum tax base . Some aspects of the 
1 98 2  amendments to the minimum tax would be helpfu l ,  
though , in moving to a consumption-based minimum tax . 
The s imi lar treatment o f  ordinary income and capital 
gains , the l imits on itemized deductions , and the 
denial of tax credits are a few examples . Other 
provi sions , however . such as the inclusion o f  
accel erated depreciation and d eductions for intangible 
dri l l ing and mining expenses ,  move in the wrong 
direc tion. A r es tructuring o f  the tax would be 
nec essary in any event to ensure the taxation of 
consumption and not o f  savings . For example , a general 
deduction should be a l l owed for savings , and borrowed 
- 1 04 -
amounts should be inc lurled in receipts . ������er�1:_1=."l/'. 
Consumption Tax I mplementation,  �ra note 34 
( d is cussing the practical d i ffic ulties o f  a tax on 
personal consumption ) .  
1 8 8 .  I d .  a t  1 65 6-5 8 .  S e e  �ra note 55 and accompanying 
te xt . 
189 . See sources c ited supra note 3 4 . 
